186, 728, 648, 668

Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
●Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

1: Longrigg
648 ●

MHl Iraq MHl

[For an account of the relations of Iraq with Great Britain, the Arab League nations, and with Turkey from 1900 to 1950, see category 116, entire source.]

[For information as to the international repercussion of the oil industry in Iraq, see 64: Shwadran M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 194-250; 255-264.]

[For data on the organization, activities, royalties and exploitation of oil by the international oil companies operating in Iraq, see 64: Shwadran M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 193-199; 201-216; 218-223; 233-235; 237-264; 276-281.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 accepted gladly a *Special Report on the Progress of 'Iraq* for the period from 1921 to 1930. The Commission was requested by the Council in June 1930 to formulate the conditions which should be fulfilled by a mandated territory for which the claim of emancipation was made. In the debates which followed, extending over two years, the part of the British spokesmen at Geneva was consistently to emphasize 'Iraqi progress, to explain observed deficiencies, and to adopt towards the future an attitude of optimism which reflected a sincere desire (whether believed or not by the political world of Baghdad) to be rid finally of mandatory responsibilities; nor was it unrealized in Whitehall that a League refusal to accept 'Iraq as a member would infallibly be ascribed by the latter to British contrary intrigues.

The many petitions received at Geneva from the 'Iraq minorities offered the clearest field in which 'Iraqi pretensions could be questioned: that is, the probable fate of the Kurds and the Assyrians—most persistent of petitioners—after British withdrawal. 'Iraqi policy on these matters seemed in fact at this time to be correct and reasonable, and the High Commissioner, cross-questioned, could specify the favourable steps already taken, could expect their continuance, and could accept British (as distinct from corporate League) 'moral responsibility' in this field should 'Iraq prove after all unworthy. The Mandates Commission reported accordingly to the Council in June 1931 that the conditions for emancipation seemed to be fulfilled—a settled and self-defending Government, good public security, sound finance, a respectable judiciary, a competent Administration—but that certain specific guarantees should still be given by the liberated nation. These were to concern the rights of minorities and of foreigners, freedom of conscience and religion, the honouring of financial obligations assumed for it by the Mandatary, the protection of previously acquired foreign rights, the observance of international Conventions, and most-favoured-nation treatment for all States-members of the League. A draft Declaration containing these guarantees was in due course prepared at Geneva and handed to the 'Iraq Government, whose Parliament debated and ratified it, with surprising complacence, in its session of 1931–2.

Satisfied by these provisions and procedures, with whatever tacit doubts, the League Council expressed on 28 January 1932 its readiness to terminate the Mandate as soon as the 'Iraq Declaration had been received. It was transmitted to Geneva in the summer of 1932 and, duly binding 'Iraq to correct and liberal treatment of all its nationality, minority, religious, and linguistic problems, it included a series of specific obligations assumed by 'Iraq towards the League. These assurances were accepted by a Committee of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the League in October 1932 and in turn satisfied the Assembly, still inclined as it was to uneasiness on the Assyrians' behalf, that no further formalities were needed. Those nations who had formerly benefited by Ottoman Capitulations and who had accepted the 1930 Anglo-'Iraq Judicial Agreement as safeguarding their subjects during its validity were now asked, and agreed, to renounce such rights henceforward permanently. With the continuing pressure of Great Britain, and the evident impatience of 'Iraq, no opposition remained to be faced; a unanimous vote of the Assembly, with the participation of fifty-two States, approved 'Iraq's membership of the League on 3 October 1932. Speeches of welcome and appreciation marked an occasion of great cordiality and some historic interest. Nuri Sa'id Pasha spoke for 'Iraq to the British representative, Sir John Simon, of the 'sincere and abiding gratitude to the British people': which indeed he, his King, and a number of the more responsible 'Iraqis may, not without reason, have briefly felt.

3. REFLECTIONS ON A MANDATE

The termination of the Mandate, popular with the main body of British opinion, had also its critics in the United Kingdom. It was by these pronounced to be premature, to represent a precedent for the abandonment of imperial interests, to fail fully to secure all-important strategic communications, and to be dangerous or fatal to the 'Iraq minorities. Such criticisms, freely ventilated in press and Parliament, were shared in part by other European and American opinion, especially in so far as they suggested that confidence in an unaided 'Iraq Government's treatment of its smaller communities was misplaced. Observers in France regretted that an internationally supervised sphere was to become an all-British preserve, while this emancipation of Arab ex-Ottoman wilayas could not but react lamentably in Syria, where French policy was following very different lines. The world's verdict, however, not only on the British abandonment of this Mandate but retrospectively on their conduct of it, was by majority eulogistic. Life and reality seemed to have been given for the first time to the ideas which had inspired the mandatory conception; a politically backward population had indeed been formed into a nation, helped with its Constitution-building and administration, advised by experts, protected by armed forces, and at the earliest moment freed from tutelage. Such a record, in praise of which many of the great and good, and many 'Iraqi and non-'Iraqi Arabs, have joined, was hailed as representing something of a 'reversal of imperialism'. Scarcely conceivable before the twentieth century, it belonged characteristically to the climate of the Western political thought

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan, where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a precaution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and conditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to blame the Company itself.

In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some 3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question. In August and September more papers were suppressed for inflammatory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker* was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps, which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry, approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan (at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the Panjwin earthquake victims.

In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status which Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946, and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a conference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views'; and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH Iraq

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verbal support in every quarter and the Baghdad Jews vied ostentatiously with Muslims in anti-Zionist fervour and subscribed heavily to funds for the refugees.

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But the campaign was from the first feebly and unfortunately conducted. The higher leadership was uninspiring, supply arrangements inadequate, and the discipline and bearing of the 'Iraqi troops, though judged to be superior to those of other Arab States except Jordan, carried them to little glory. Units entered Palestine on 15 May between Geshen and Wadi Yabis and marched on Tul Karm and Nablus, areas unoccupied by the Jews; their attempt on Tiberias was unsuccessful, but they effectively occupied the Nablus–Tiberias–Janin triangle and advanced to within twelve miles of Tel Aviv. This hopeful move was frustrated by Jewish resistance in front of Nathaniya and by counter-pressure which forced the 'Iraqis to abandon Bayt Tima and give ground in the occupied triangle. The Security Council's cease-fire order of 22 May had been at first ignored by all, but both sides accepted a four-weeks' truce operative on 11 June. The impetus of Arab invasion had by that time been lost, their weakness exposed, and their initial superiority in heavy arms, which was never to recur, had availed them little; and during the truce period equipment poured into the Jewish Army, none into the Arab. After the rejection of proposals evolved by the United Nations mediator, Count Bernadotte, and his Truce Commission for a federation of Arab and Jewish States in Palestine and Jordan, fighting was renewed on 9 July. A further 'Iraqi attempt to take Nathaniya was foiled, the Jews swept into Galilee, and their deeper advance was stopped only by the second truce which was observed from 18 July. This at the Arab League meeting at Aley was rejected only by the 'Iraq Government, and that for reasons of pride and policy; but it was in fact operative and the war, for 'Iraq, was over.

The many attempts to restore peace to Palestine and solve its insoluble problems, the murder of Bernadotte by the Jews, the renewal of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities from October to the end of 1948, form no part of the history of 'Iraq. 'Iraq Army units remained in occupation of the east Palestine triangle for some months, dependent as ever on their long line of communications through Jordan and receiving their pay irregularly from the almost empty Treasury at home. Ṣalih Ṣa'ib was recalled to 'Iraq as Chief of Staff, to return again to Palestine later as Commander-in-Chief of the combined 'Iraqi-Jordan forces; but this experiment in joint command lasted but a few weeks, and the wider project of a unified command for all League forces—a clear military necessity—was frustrated by division among the States and by Egyptian refusal. No real effect was given to the resolution of the 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

382 1951 be anticipated that the continued presence and enlarged operations of the oil companies would remain an outstanding economic and social advantage to the 'Iraqi people: that, especially after the destruction of the great oil industry of Persia by the action of its Government, 'Iraq's position as a supplier of crude petroleum must give it an international importance greater than ever before: but also that the minds and emotions of local patriots, for whom the Persian tragedy had no terrors and no lesson, would not abandon the demand for a 'nationalization' which might or might not (according to its form and manner) permit the continuance of the industry. It was indeed clear that the presence in 'Iraq of successful, wealthy, and well-organized European enterprises with their foreign control, high living standards, and concession-granted privileges must, however correct their conduct and however enlightened their policy, be offensive to the nationalist sentiment of at least one school of local politicians; and the period during which oil development on these lines might be able to continue could not, for all its enormous advantages to the country, be confidently foreseen.

651 Meanwhile, to the 'Iraqi Treasury its receipts from oil sources
● 648 were no longer a mere helpful supplement to other revenues but a
471 main pillar of the Government itself and the foundation of all its hopes of development and improvement. The anxiety of 'Iraqi statesmen to derive still greater revenues from the oil industry than those provided in the 1925 or 1931 concessions—4 shillings (gold) per ton—and their claim that 'gold' should be translated into sterling at unofficial open-market rates led from 1947 to 1951 to repeated discussions between Government and Company. The gold question of which the Company, at 'Iraq's request, agreed in 1949 to allow settlement by a British Court rather than by arbitration, remained still unsettled when the period closed, with indications that the Baghdad Government intended still to press its full claims.[1] The question of royalty revision resulted in 1950 in a partly retroactive and conditional agreement to raise the 4 shillings gold per ton to 6 shillings gold; but this increase, immediately helpful as it was to the 'Iraq Treasury, was in turn to be superseded by further and long-drawn negotiations based on a new principle of half-and-half division of the profits: a principle which, first announced by the Arabian-American Company in Sau'di Arabia on the last day of 1950, could not but abruptly supersede all less favourable terms enjoyed by neighbouring countries. Conversations on this basis were in progress in Baghdad between Company

[1] These might amount to some £20 million sterling. Agreement upon a compromise figure (£5 million) was reached by the negotiators in 1951, but did not form part of the settlement ratified by Parliament early in 1952.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Government throughout the first half of 1951 and were to embrace the production obligations of all the companies operating in 'Iraq and the royalties or taxes expected from them.[1] Under the influence of the 'nationalization' movement—but in more moderate form than the brutal self-mutilation of Persia—the 'Iraq Government decided in 1951 to nationalize the refining and distribution of its oil in so far as this was consumed in 'Iraq itself: the operation, that is, of the Khaniqin and Rafidain Oil Companies. Negotiations with these and with Anglo-Iranian, their parent, led to agreement on the basis that the Companies were to transfer their plant and assets to the State at a valuation, and to remain for ten years as operating agents on its behalf.

The Port of Baṣra in the period 1946–50 maintained and substantially improved its services—wharves and sheds, cranes and machinery—and, in spite of the increased cost of labour and supplies, could show a profit on each year's operations. It continued annually to pay off its capital debt, completing that process in 1951. It maintained and largely increased its electric-power and water supplies to Baṣra city. The airport, with its wireless service and its enlarged hotel, remained Port property. The dredging-depot at Fao was extended, an all-weather road constructed to link it by land to Baṣra. A shore depot was built at Ḥarmaq, opposite Abadan. The traffic using Ma'qil wharves decreased abruptly from the level of the previous five war years, but the tanker traffic of the Anglo-Iranian increased, until the spring of 1951, more than sufficiently to compensate for this. The development of a subsidiary port at Umm Qaṣr, on the Khur 'Abdullah, was a

[1] The new Oil Agreement, based on acceptance in August 1951 of the principle of equal division of profits between Government and Company, was ratified by Parliament in February 1952, and made retroactive to 1 January 1951. With the probable initial through-put (in a full year) of the 30-inch line (some 14 to 15 million tons a year) additional to the existing through-put (nearly 8 million) of the 12-inch and 16-inch lines to Tripoli, 'Iraq's revenues from this source were expected—on existing cost and price bases—to surpass £30 million in 1952 and to reach £60 million in 1955. Minimum production was agreed at 22 million tons a year (for I.P.C. and M.P.C. combined) from 1954 onwards, and 8 million from B.P.C. from the end of 1955. Government was assured that its receipts would be not less than a quarter of the seaboard value of I.P.C. and M.P.C. crude oil, and a third of that of B.P.C. Fluctuation of costs and of world oil prices was to be taken into account in ascertaining the divisible 'profits', and Government might, if it wished, take in kind 12½ per cent. of the crude produced, and either dispose of it or sell it back to the Companies. A large part of the balance of Government's revenue was to be received in the form of income tax. Minimum receipts to Government, guaranteed subject only to *force majeure*, were to be £20 million sterling in 1953 and 1954, and £25 million in 1955 and thereafter; in the event of a physically unavoidable failure in production a smaller minimum would be payable for two years. The Agreement covered in addition the doubling of 'Iraqi representation on the Boards of the Companies, restrictions on the appointment of non-'Iraqis to positions in the Companies, an increase (up to fifty per year) of 'Iraqis maintained in British universities for higher studies, and the extension of technical education organized by the Company in Kirkuk fields.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education is not possible without some reference to the history and present circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932 as an independent nation with membership of the League of Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Administrative reforms and some social advance were attempted during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority of the population. Attempts have been made by successive Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain, all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective participation in the government of the country must inevitably be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a pipe resembling the chanter of a bagpipe and has often a pleasant lilt. Kurdish dancing, however, is by no means as strenuous as Scottish. Kurds and all other mountain dwellers in Kurdistan dance what is known as the chain-dance, similar to that which is, I believe, commonly seen in the Balkans. The dancers join hands and form a ring. The piper and a drummer with a sort of tenor drum stand in the middle, and the dance consists of fairly intricate footwork while the circle moves slowly round. Often star dancers who fancy themselves as budding Nijinskys do solo dances inside the circle. Amongst the Kurds the men and women dance separately, but with the Christian sects the two sexes dance together. This does not mean, however, that Kurdish women are completely segregated or kept by themselves. As a matter of fact, they possess considerable freedom and may be seen gathering firewood, tending animals or engaged in other tasks on the mountainside, often far from their villages.

Up to five years ago the Barzan district of Kurdistan retained all of its savage and primitive features. Government had not penetrated and Shaikh Ahmed, a religious fanatic, was dictator. With the help of his brothers and a standing army of several hundred men he completely dominated the impoverished inhabitants, who had the shaikh's bodyguard perpetually billeted on them and who had to provide them with food, clothing and tobacco and anything else they might fancy. Any protests on the part of the villagers were discouraged by the strongest methods. Such complete ascendancy did Shaikh Ahmed gain over his savage and illiterate people that they began to look upon him as a god and, though Muslims in name, turned their faces towards him in prayer rather than towards Mecca, as tradition demands. There was a Mullah in the district called Mullah Juj, who represented himself to be the prophet of this new god. The Mullah was a very fiery and eloquent speaker and, unfortunately for himself, his fame began to surpass even that of the deity. This could not of course be tolerated, and one of Shaikh Ahmed's brothers "bumped off" the presumptuous prophet. Up to that time the Koran had been revered, but now the Shaikh issued orders for the destruction of all copies to be found. He also withdrew the ban on the eating of pork, for wild pig were plentiful in Barzan. Armed missionaries were sent out beyond the Barzan bounds, and villages which refused to accept the Shaikh were burned and a number of the male inhabitants put to death. This state of affairs could not be allowed to continue, and the 'Iraq Government was forced to take action in conjunction with the British Royal Air Force.

44 Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MH1 Iraq MH1
Kurd MH1

Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani, where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil, where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran. During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Government to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popularize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful. Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret, tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited by the improvement in public security and communications and is

4q Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MH Iraq MH
Kuwl MH

000 of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

K 137 Kurdistan is a beautiful country. It is in the main well wooded, with scrub or stunted oak on the hillsides and poplars, walnuts and mulberries near the villages. Pines grow in two areas only and chinārs (planes) along the streams. Unfortunately, deforestation is proceeding apace, and unless immediate and drastic steps are taken by the 'Iraq Government, heavy soil erosion and a tremendous decrease in grazing facilities will take place. Few new walnut trees are to be found owing to a prevalent superstition that the planter of a walnut tree will die with the appearance of the first nuts. It might be supposed that the oldest inhabitants could be employed in planting, but apparently the grandfathers look askance at this suggestion!

K 181 The Kurds are a virile and cheerful people. They have been called treacherous, and undoubtedly stories can be quoted in support of this accusation. Yet it must be remembered that the annals of our own Scottish highlands are by no means clean in this respect.

K 164 221 342 In the summer the valleys of Kurdistan are, unfortunately, very malarial, and this is fostered by the cultivation of rice with its invariable accompaniment of mosquitoes. During this season most of the flock-owners move to their " zōzāns " or summer sheilings on the mountain tops, where, in shelters of oak branches, they pass the time pleasantly enough.

Christians

I 795 The Christians of the northern provinces are divided into numerous sects, several of which are relics of the old schismatic divisions of the Eastern Communion. They include Chaldeans and Syrian Catholics, who are under the control of Rome, Jacobites, Armenians, Nestorians and Seventh Day Adventists.

I 795 167 563 ● 648 162 Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics and Jacobites are found in Mosul and many villages on the left bank of the Tigris. Chaldeans are also found in the Supna valley near Amadia and in one large village near Arbil. Seventh Day Adventists only flourish in Mosul. Many people in England know something of the Assyrians and their recent history. The Assyrians themselves claim to be descendants of the famous kingdom of Nineveh and are certainly semitic. The term " Assyrian " now includes ex-Ottoman members of the Nestorian Church who were domiciled either within what is now the 'Iraq state or who were ejected from Hakkari by the Turks during the Great War and refused

4s Wilson G-8 (no date) 1937 MH1 Iraq MH1
Yazidis MH 10

readmission afterwards, and also members of other Christian sects belonging to the recognized tribes of Hakkari who accompanied their Nestorian brethren in the War exodus to 'Iraq via Persia. Since the Turks refused to readmit these people and Great Britain, when peace terms were concluded with Turkey, was not in a position to insist, it was necessary to try and find lands for them within the borders of the 'Iraq state. The Assyrians wished to be settled as a homogeneous unit, but this was impossible as it would have meant displacing a large number of Kurds. Many of the Assyrians were settled on such lands as were available, but in 1933 serious trouble broke out between some of these settlers and the 'Iraq Government, and incidents occurred which made it impossible for at any rate all the Assyrians to remain in 'Iraq. Various schemes were examined, including settlement in Brazil, British Guiana and on the Orontes in Syria. None of these, however, proved practicable, and the matter is still in the hands of the Council of the League of Nations. In the meantime 6,000 Assyrians have been settled temporarily on the River Khabur in eastern Syria, and the remainder, numbering some 20,000, are still in 'Iraq. Those in Syria include several complete tribes. The condition of those in 'Iraq may be said to be satisfactory at present and they possess very large numbers of animals of all kinds. Many are also employed as mechanics, clerks, etc., by the big oil companies and in the 'Iraq railways and police. All these possess 'Iraqi nationality. A certain number are also employed as aerodrome guards by the British Royal Air Force, duties which are shared by them with Arabs and Kurds. The Assyrians are a brave, hardy race, though obstinate as isolated, uneducated mountaineers are liable to be. It is indeed a tragedy that they should have been caught up in the wheel of events and severely mangled in the process.

I 795 167 648 563 162 [I 463] I 147

The Yezidis

The Yezidis are usually known as "devil-worshippers." This is, however, a misnomer. "Devil-propitiators" would be more correct. They believe that Satan, whom they call Mālik Tāūs or the Peacock Angel, was exiled from Heaven for a definite period and is, after the lapse of a few thousand years, to be restored to high favour. It is incumbent on them therefore to keep on the right side of him, so that he may then use his influence on their behalf. It is extremely difficult to investigate the Yezidi religion. The priests teach that education, save for their caste, is forbidden by the "Black Books," the Yezidi

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438 more attractive for industry than other areas can be corrected by
[365] proper action. First and foremost is the relative cheapness of power and fuel in Baghdad. The cost of the electric power unit in most cities is double that of Baghdad and rarely is a municipality-owned plant able to supply sufficient power to industry. The cost of oil fuel is at least ten percent higher outside Baghdad. The correction of these factors, together with a more equal distribution of educational, housing, transport and social welfare facilities, could greatly relieve the situation. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry could also be amended so as to give additional concessions for industries established in other parts of the country. The cost of labour and land is already becoming burdensome for industry in Baghdad. This, in addition to the social evil of overcrowdedness, calls for immediate consideration.

434 (4) Limitation of Markets: A newly industrialised country can hardly hope to find foreign markets for its finished products. It has to depend on its home market. The market in Iraq, with its small population (about 5 million inhabitants), of low purchasing power (annual income per head is estimated at between £ 20 and £ 30 or $85), affords very limited scope for large-scale industry. Many of the industries studied at one time by the Industrial Bank, such as the making of artificial silk fibres, the manufacture of paper and cardboard from straw, and the printing of cotton piece-goods, had to be abandoned because the smallest economic unit of these plants is much beyond the capacity of the Iraqi market to support. This situation will no doubt improve as the whole economy of the coun-
439 try expands. But it should be possible to deal with this situation
648 more effectively by joint action on the part of the Arab States, along lines already discussed at high political level. These discussions have had the object of reducing or abolishing inter-state tariff barriers so as to make the whole area one market. Such an action is indeed vital to the progress and prosperity of these countries and their peoples. It should be remembered that before World War I, these countries formed one economic and political unit under the Ottoman Empire.

464 (5) Labour, Technical Staff and Management Problems: The supply of ordinary labour, owing to the high rate of population increase (estimated to be one and a half per cent per annum) and emigration from country to town, is quite sufficient and will remain so

464 production side, is quite common. Often foreign managers are
472 employed as experts on the basis of a monthly or annual salary,
473 sometimes with a commission in the form of a percentage of net profits. In one case at least production management is given to an independent foreign firm of engineers against a fixed annual payment. This so-called "managing agency system" has been recently introduced in Iraq and has not given rise to any complaints yet. The "system" however has resulted in many abuses in India where it is widely used, and it is now under investigation in that country. [1]

648 6. **Foreign Capital and Participation**: Except where foreign enter-
1157 prise has obtained a concession for the development of important
471 resources such as oil, or the supply of light and power as in the Baghdad area, there is very little foreign capital invested in industry as such. Foreign capital for reasons beyond the scope of our discussion has been invested in Iraq mainly in trade and commercial banking (short-term lending). It may be to the benefit of Iraq to induce foreign capital, and perhaps management, to participate in industry. One of the best ways to get the advantage of foreign technical skill and experience, and to bridge the gulf between the existing state of technique in Iraq and that attained by highly organised industry abroad, is to encourage foreign firms to establish branch factories in Iraq. Such branches would have their own capital and management in which Iraqi nationals and foreigners could join together on an agreed basis. It is possible that the limitation of market and geographical position may discourage foreign firms from taking this course. Some of them would require special concessions to induce them to come to Iraq. Many of them are perhaps ignorant of the possibilities that exist. And many others may require some guarantees as to: (a) the remittance of profits and repatriation of capital, (b) equal treatment with Iraqi capital and industry, (c) in case of nationalisation, fair and equitable compensation. In all these respects Iraqi practice in the past has been quite generous, but there is no legislation which clearly defines government policy toward foreign enterprise. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1950) stipu-
648 lates that 55 per cent of the capital should be owned by Iraqi
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[1] *The First Five Year Plan, Draft Plan* Government of India, Planning Commission, July 1951, p. 161.

5:al Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHl Iraq MHl

nationals in order that industry may qualify for the concessions granted by that law. This may appear as a discrimination against foreign capital and some foreign industrialists have raised this point. But considering the great concessions granted by the Law, including the appropriation of state land, and the smallness of the majority reserved for nationals, the "discrimination" is nominal. Past experience of foreign capital investment in the Middle East does not allow the removal of such safeguards. However, the writer believes that proper legislation on these three points mentioned above would give foreign industrialists sufficient assurance; and, given the proper information and contacts, many firms may be induced to establish branches in Iraq to the benefit of all concerned.[1]

7. Other problems: There are other less important industrial problems which should be mentioned even though limitations of space prevent full discussion of them.

(a) It should be realized that Iraqi industry labours under a heavy burden of over-capitalization which adds to its costs. There is a tendency to have completely integrated plants; most industries have to maintain a power generating plant either to provide electricity, or as a spare in case of failure in the city supply. Practically all industries have their own workshops. There is a strong desire on the part of all industry owners to be self-sufficient with regard to supply of materials, chemicals and spare parts. Many industries have been induced to purchase more land than they actually need in order to guard against future needs and also to profit from the expected rise in land values. This has led to an insufficient utilization of machinery and to a great amount of working capital, per unit of production, locked up. These facts are reflected in the balance sheets of many industries in the form of Loans from Banks (commercial banks) which in some cases reach 50 per cent of nominal capital and thus increase the fixed charges which industry has to meet. The reason for this desire on the part of industrials to be more or less completely self-sufficient lies in the fact that, owing to the country's industrial immaturity, it is often impossible to rely on efficient service from outside plants when required. The need to keep great stores of

[1] In accordance with the economic boycott enforced by Arab States, firms having business relations with Israel are excluded.

6: Ireland MH1 Iraq MH1

● 648

/For an account of policies and developments in the relations between Iraq and Great Britain after the First World War, see category 116, pp. 151-189. For treaty negotiations between Iraq and Great Britain see pp. 338-361 and 393-418./

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

175* 648 century. The entry of Germany into Turkey and the Persian Gulf, although ostensibly based on commercial ventures[1] and on concessions from the Porte to build a railroad through Anatolia to the Persian Gulf,[2] came to be regarded as a greater threat than Russia to the *status quo* in those areas which Great Britain had come to look upon as her own special spheres. Lord Lansdowne's official statement of policy was directed as much at Germany as at Russia, although Germany chose to regard it as applicable only to Russia.

Germany's early interest in Turkey had not been regarded with alarm. The decision of 'Abdul Hamīd, in 1899, to grant the concession for a railroad to the Persian Gulf had been welcomed in England as a check to both Russian and French

[1] Details cannot be given here of the activities of the firm of Wonckhaus in the Persian Gulf, of the negotiations for the railroad concessions, of the political significance attached to the railway project both in Germany and elsewhere, and of the increase of German prestige and influence in Turkey generally. Of the mass of literature existing on this whole subject, the following may be consulted: *The Times History of the World War*, Vol. III, ch. lii; *Report on the Condition and Prospects of British Trade in Mesopotamia*, Lloyd, George, 1908 (confidential). Rohrbach, P., *Die Bagdadbahn* (Berlin, 1903); Helfferich, K., *Die deutsche Türkenpolitik* (Berlin, 1921); Schaefer, C. A., *Die Entwicklung der Bagdadbahnpolitik* (Weimar, 1916); Muller, K. H., *Die Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn* (Hamburg, 1916); Cheradame, André, *La Question d'Orient: la Macédoine, le chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Paris, 1903); also, *The Baghdad Railway*, *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, 1911; Lewin, Evans, *The German Road to the East* (New York, 1917); Earle, Edward M., *Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway* (New York, 1923). See also Lynch, H. F. B., 'The Bagdad Railway', *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1911; *Quarterly Review*, October, 1917, pp. 491-528 (by Sir Alwyn Parker, Foreign Office).

[2] For texts of the concessions: *Actes de la concession du chemin de fer Eski Shehr-Konia* (Constantinople, 1893); also, *Report of the Anatolian Railway Company* (1896), pp. 4, 9, preliminary concession, 1899; Young, G., *Corps de droit Ottoman*, Vol. III, pp. 342-51; cf. *Report of the Anatolian Railway Company*, 1902, p. 8; provisional convention, 1902: Lecoq, R., *Un chemin de fer en Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1907), appendix; definitive convention, March 5th, 1903: *Parl. Papers*, 1911 (Cd. 5635), CIII, 1. This also contains the additional convention of 1908, as well as the Statutes of the Imperial Bagdad Railroad Company, Specifications, the Loan Contract, First Series, 1903; Loan Contract, Second and Third Series, 1908; third and fourth additional conventions, March 21st, 1911: *troisième convention additionelle et quatrième convention additionelle à la convention du 5 Mars*, 1903, *relative au chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Constantinople, 1911).

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

175* 648

ambitions.[1] The phenomenal expansion of Germany's industries and of her overseas commerce, the penetration of markets hitherto regarded as Britain's own, the sudden growth of Germany's mercantile marine, her Navy bills of 1899 and 1900, the colonial demands and aspirations of German diplomatists, the noisy anti-British demonstrations at the time of the Boer War, however, led the English public, stimulated by the Press, to believe that not only Great Britain's markets but also her political prestige in the East and in Africa were being seriously challenged.

The possibility of curbing German political expansion in Turkish Arabia by means of British participation in the Baghdad Railway had, at first, seemed likely, but the suggestion of the Prime Minister, Mr. Arthur Balfour, April 7th and 8th, 1903,[2] that H.M. Government should approve of the investment of British capital in the railway at the invitation of the German financiers,[3] providing such participation were on the basis of equality with any other Power, raised a storm of disapproval in the House and in the press.[4] Protests of the shipping companies serving India, of the owners of the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company, and of the British-owned Railways in Asia Minor may have also added to the

[1] Lord Salisbury is reported to have said in 1900: 'We are in no way unfavourably impressed by the grant of the concessions in question. On the contrary we welcome them for in this way Germany comes into line with our interests in the Persian Gulf.' *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, 1871-1914 (hereafter *G.P.*), (Berlin, 1922-7), Vol. XVII, No. 5212, p. 373. Also Lord Lansdowne to F. Lascelles, March 18th, 1902, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, No. 204, pp. 177-8; *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CI (1902), pp. 129, 597, 628, 669; Vol. CXXII (1903), p. 1371.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CXX (1903), pp. 1207-8, 1358-78.

[3] von Gwinner, A., 'The Baghdad Railway and the Question of British Co-operation', *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1909.

[4] *The Times*, April 9th, 14th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 24th; *Daily Mail*, April 9th, 18th, 22nd; *The Daily Telegraph*, April 8th, 9th; *Pall Mall Gazette*, April 9th, 11th, 22nd, 24th; *Spectator*, April 4th, 11th, 18th, 25th; *Manchester Guardian*, April 15th, 1903. Yate, Col. A. C., *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, May 22nd, 1911, p. 19; Johnson, Sir H. H., *Common Sense in Foreign Policy* (London, 1913), pp. v-vii. Cf., also, Lord Curzon, *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. VII (1911), pp. 583-7, 589.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

opposition[1] which, without doubt, extended to his own cabinet. Mr. Balfour was forced to declare to the House of Commons, April 23rd, 1903, that H.M. Government would give no support to British financial participation in the project.[2]

What the British Government had failed to secure by financial participation, it attempted to secure through diplomatic negotiations. The *rapprochement* between England and France already in the air soon became a reality.[3] The three agreements signed on April 8th, 1904,[4] settled the outstanding points of friction, initiated the *Entente Cordiale* and paved the way for the defensive alliance between the two countries.[5]

The period of 'splendid isolation' for Great Britain had come to an end. Instead there was inaugurated an era of diplomacy among the Powers which aimed, on the one hand, at securing on the basis of compensations[6] a recognition of spheres of interest in Asia and in Africa, thus avoiding points of conflict, and, on the other hand, at providing for collective security in the event that rival ambitions, either commercial or territorial, could not be reconciled.

Tentative negotiations towards an Anglo-Russian *rapproche-*

[1] *The Times*, April 18th, 19th, 24th, 1903.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CXXI (1903), pp. 271-2. Lord Lansdowne seems to have believed that 'the scuttle of British financiers' at the newspaper opposition made impossible for the Government to give assurances of its support. *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, Minute on No. 224, p. 196. Cf., Earle, op. cit., p. 186.

[3] For early indications of the *rapprochement*, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français* (hereafter *Docs. Fr.*) (Paris, 1922-9), 2nd Series, Vol. II, No. 524 (December 12th, 1902), p. 653; Vol. III, No. 138 (March 14th, 1903), p. 186; Vol. III, No. 192 (April 23rd, 1903), p. 258. Also, Tardieu, A., *La France et les Alliances* (Paris, 1908), pp. 51-72.

[4] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, Nos. 356-416, pp. 292-373; *Docs. Fr.*, 2nd Series, Vol. III, Nos. 362, 363, 381, 384, 387, 392, 419; Vol. IV, Secs. ii, iiiA, viiB, viii. Texts of the three agreements: *Accts. and Papers*, 1904 (Cd. 1952), CX, 323-4, 340-1, 1905 (Cd. 2383), CIII, 241; 1905 (Cmd. 2384), CIII, 265; 1905 (Cmd. 2385), CIII, 285. Secret articles of Egyptian Declaration; ibid., 1911 (Cd. 5969), CIII, 353 ff. Also in *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, pp. 374-98, with earlier drafts in parallel columns.

[5] On discussions from 1906, on the Anglo-French defensive alliance, see *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. III, Nos. 210-21, pp. 170-203.

[6] A 'give and take arrangement', as Lord Lansdowne expressed it, July 2nd, 1903, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, No. 356, p. 293.

6:Ireland 3-5 (no date)1937 MH Iraq MH1

ment had been interrupted by the Russo-Japanese war.[1] Russia's defeat and her domestic difficulties in 1905 made her more amenable to settlement of her Middle East differences with Great Britain on August 31st, 1907, when an Anglo-Russian Convention was signed.[2] By it Persia, without her consent, was partitioned into spheres of influence, as foreshadowed by the suggestion of the Government of India in 1899.[3] No reference was made, however, to the Persian Gulf or to Turkish Arabia, although Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had pressed urgently for the inclusion of a clause recognizing the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf.[4] To remedy the omission, Sir Edward, in a dispatch to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, August 27th, 1907, noted, on behalf of H.M. Government, that the Russian Government had explicitly stated that they did not deny the special interest of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. He added: 'H.M. Government think it advisable to draw attention to previous declarations of British policy and to affirm generally previous statements as to British interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them.'[5]

The Convention was not so much an attempt at territorial expansion as an attempt to recognize the *status quo*, to check

[1] Lansdowne to P. Cambon, October 26th, 1903; ibid., Vol. II, No. 250, pp. 217-18. Also: ibid., Vol. IV, Nos. 181-8, pp. 183-94, especially, Lansdowne to Spring-Rice, November 17th, 1903, No. 1812, p. 183.

[2] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 339, p. 388; Nos. 341-517, pp. 389-576; *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CLVII (1906), p. 1416, Sir E. Grey's statement, May 24th, 1906. For part played by Baghdad Railway, Driault, E., *La Question d'Orient depuis ses Origines* (Paris, 1921), pp. 273 ff. For text: Treaty Series, No. 34 (1907), in *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3753), CXXV, 489; also, ibid., 1908 (Cd. 3750), CXXV, 477; *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, c, 276-7.

[3] *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3882), CXXV, 465. But cf.: Hardinge to Grey, December 23rd, 1905, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 322, 276-7.

[4] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 417, p. 465; No. 421, p. 470; No. 425, p. 473; Minutes on No. 428, pp. 476-7; Enclosure to No. 429, pp. 480-1; No. 430, pp. 481-2; No. 434, p. 484.

[5] *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3750), CXXV, 477, Dispatch No. 1, Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson, August 27th, 1907. For previous declarations of policy, see Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty* (4 vols., 1875-91), Vol. IV, pp. 2615-17, 2624-7; Lord Lansdowne, *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CXXI (1903), pp. 1347-8; Lord Salisbury, July, 1878; Hoskins, op. cit., p. 446.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

175* 648 further Russian advances and to free England to deal with Germany's 'Drang nach Osten'. It was received in England, however, with great disapproval. Of those opposed to the Convention, some alleged that it needlessly sacrificed British interests. Others voiced their misgivings lest Persian opinion, hitherto friendly to Great Britain, should be alienated. These apprehensions were not unjustified, the ill-feeling which the partition aroused in Persia being exploited to the fullest extent by Germany during the Great War. Nevertheless, the Convention served its purpose, particularly in relieving pressure on India and the Persian Gulf at a time when it was most needed.[1]

Early attempts at an Anglo-German understanding had failed.[2] Following, however, the Anglo-Russian Convention, Great Britain turned to negotiations with Germany and with Turkey on the question of the Baghdad Railroad which had continued to grow in international importance. To Turkey, consent to the increase in customs was held out in return for concessions which would both safeguard and consolidate England's acquired position in Turkish Arabia. To Germany, Great Britain was willing to make concessions in order to secure her original demands as stated by Lord Haldane to Emperor William II at Windsor in November, 1907:[3] the right to construct and control the section of the Baghdad Railway

[1] Sir E. Grey to Committee of Imperial Defence, May 26th, 1911; *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, App. 5, pp. 788-9. Also, MacCaulay, Capt. D. I., *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, October 10th, 1909. The convention was probably not sincerely observed by either Russia or England. See, *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. VII (1911), p. 605; Vol. 10, pp. 678, 694, 697; Cox to Grey, September 28th, 1913; Minute by H. G. Chick, Commercial Adviser to the Persian Gulf Residency; Government of India to Marquess of Crewe (Confidential), January 22nd, 1914, cited in *Behind the Veil in Persia* (Amsterdam, 1917), pp. 148-57.

[2] For these early negotiations, see: *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. I, No. 122 (August 21st, 1898), pp. 100-1; Vol. II, No. 77 (March 18th, 1901), pp. 60-1 and documents ff.; Vol. III, No. 1 (May 18th, 1904), p. 1; *G.P.*, Vol. XIV, ch. xci; Vol. XVII, ch. cix. For an official review of Anglo-German relations, see *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. III, App. A, pp. 397 ff.

[3] Haldane, Viscount R. B., *Before the War* (1920), p. 48; *Autobiography* (1929), p. 220; also, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, Nos. 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, pp. 91-9. From the German side: *G.P.*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 17-22; Baron von Schoen, *Memoirs of an Ambassador* (1922), pp. 59-63.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, thereby securing 'the gate to India'.[1] In 1909 she was prepared to grant Germany a free hand in Turkey north of Baghdad in return for the recognition of similar privileges for Great Britain in southern Mesopotamia.[2]

A settlement along these lines was not out of keeping with the attitude of the Powers, including Austria and Italy, during the period 1907 to 1914,[3] in which there 'was an approach to a general agreement among the European nations with reference to their interests',[4] i.e. the creation of special economic and political spheres of influence. Russia and England had already partitioned Persia in 1907. By the Potsdam Agreement, August 19th, 1911, Germany and Russia recognized each other's special interests in Asia Minor and in Persia.[5] France and Germany brought their commercial interests in the Near and

[1] This arrangement, proposed to Dr. A. von Gwinner, December 13th, 1903, was accepted by him as far as the financial interests were concerned. Nothing came of it, however: *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, No. 224, p. 195. It was put forward officially as the basis of British policy, April 25th, 1907, Grey to Bertie, ibid., Vol. VI, No. 249, p. 355. Also, Grey to Cambon and to Benckdorf, June 4th, 1907; ibid., No. 250, p. 355. For the renewal of the proposals: Grey to Goschen, October 28th, 1909, ibid., No. 277, p. 379; Marling to Grey, ibid., No. 282, pp. 384-5; and Memo. by Sir H. Babington Smith, ibid., App. 7, pp. 793-4 Enclosure to No. 309, p. 410.

[2] *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, No. 277, p. 370; No. 287, p. 388. Also, the confidential letter from the Russian Ambassador, Constantinople, to Iswolsky, November 25th, 1909, de Siebert, B., *Entente Diplomacy and the World War*, 1909-1914 (New York, 1922), No. 576, p. 510: 'The projected treaty is equivalent to partition of Turkey into a British and a German sphere of interst: England granting Germany freedom of action in Turkey, in Europe and Asia Minor, and claiming such for herself only in the Turkish territories in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. The projected treaty with Germany completes England's sovereignty in the Persian Gulf.' Also, Russian Ambassador, London, to Iswolsky, ibid., No. 570, p. 507.

[3] For an able account of these pre-war aspirations: Howard, H. N., *Partition of Turkey* (Norman, 1931), pp. 50-60.

[4] *Official Report on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1913.

[5] Text: *Die Kriegschuldfrage*, March, 1924, p. 63. The Potsdam Agreement undoubtedly had its origin in fear of an Anglo-German understanding. In such an event, as the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople wrote to Iswolsky, November 25th, 1909: 'France and Russia would stand alone, which has to be prevented . . . Hence there remains only direct though parallel negotiations between . . . Germany and Russia and Germany and France.' de Siebert, op. cit., No. 576, p. 510. Also, ibid., No. 582, p. 515; No. 619, p. 543. For negotiations, see *G.P.*, Vol. XXVII, Nos. 10218-25, pp. 950-62; *Un Livre Noir* (R. Marchand, ed., 3 vols., Paris, 1922-27), Vol. II, pp. 501-76.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

175 * 648 Middle East into agreement between 1910 and 1914.[1] From Great Britain, France had secured in 1912 a pledge of disinterestedness in Syria.[2]

Negotiations with Turkey had been opened in 1909 but not until 1913 was an agreement possible, Great Britain having been forced to give way on many of her original proposals.[3] By Agreements signed July 29th, 1913, Great Britain secured the recognition of her special position in the Persian Gulf and of the validity of her existing treaties with Kuwait and Bahrain. The terminus of the Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, beyond which the railway was not to extend without the consent of Great Britain. Two British subjects were to be appointed to the Board of the railway. Equal charges, dues and treatment on the railway were guaranteed to all nations. The development and future of the port of Basra were to be partially entrusted to British hands. Exclusive rights of navigation were secured for a new company, eventually formed by Lord Inchcape and the existing Lynch Line, whose privileges were extended.[4] Turkey recognized the right of Great Britain to buoy, light and police the Shatt al-'Arab and the Persian Gulf.[5]

During this period of negotiations, both the Foreign Office[6] and British representatives in Turkish Arabia were concerned

[1] The Franco-German Agreement was signed February 15th, 1914. See Earle, op. cit., p. 328, also *Docs. Fr.*, 3rd Series, Vol. III, No. 239, p. 317.

[2] M. Pichon at Secret Meeting of the Four Powers, Paris, March 20th, 1919: Baker, R. S., *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (3 vols., 1922-3), Vol. III, p. 3.

[3] A long series of drafts and counter-drafts had been made as on March 1st, 1911, April 15, 1912, etc. Various sections of the Agreements had been initialed on May 6th and June 11th, 1913.

[4] Hakki Pasha and Lord Inchcape signed a concession, December 12th, 1913. Lord Inchcape and the Lynch Line came to an agreement, March 27th, 1914.

[5] Great Britain, however, made its adherence to the Agreements and consent to the increase in Custom dues, sought by Turkey, contingent on the removal of the Ottoman veto on Egyptian borrowing powers, on further railway concessions and on recognition of the D'Arcy Concession to Turkish oil fields. *Quarterly Review*, October, 1917, pp. 517-21; *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. LIII (1913), pp. 392-5; de Siebert, op. cit., ch. XX; *The Times*, May 17th and 31st, 1913.

[6] Minute by Sir E. Grey, March 12, 1910, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, No. 325, p. 433.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

with increasing Great Britain's influence and prestige, not only to counteract the importance of the Baghdad Railway, but also to provide a greater claim to Mesopotamia as her sphere of influence in the event of the break-up of Turkey. The Resident of Baghdad had telegraphed, June 23rd, 1913, to the Government of India and to H.M. Ambassador at Constantinople:

> In view of the possible break-up of Turkey and in the meantime the development of preparatory foreign spheres of interest, it seems incumbent on the British Government to preserve every kind of priority which they already possessed in Mesopotamia, their natural sphere in the Ottoman dominions. Hence any abolition of British Post Offices in Turkey should not extend to those at Baghdad and Basra. The Residency guard and the R.I.M.S. *Comet* are appurtenances to be jealously guarded, for the present.[1]

A month later, the Acting Resident in Baghdad presented a full plan for extending Great Britain's position.[2] He advocated an extension of the irrigation system under British auspices, as one of the most important means to that end, saying: 'To gain control of this system and create an *imperium imperio* is important. Control of water will give control of revenue assessment, perhaps control of collection.' As to railways, they would be auxiliary to irrigation and to the agriculture which it would encourage,[3] while steam navigation, he believed, would have to give way both to irrigation and to the railways. The importance of oil, in his opinion, had not been proven.[4]

Germany was not unwilling that Great Britain should possess

[1] Cited: *Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, June, 1913.

[2] He had already urged that increased efforts should be made to add Mōsul, not then belonging to any sphere of influence, to Great Britain's sphere. He had suggested that the Church Missionary Society might be aided financially and that Sir Edward Grey should approach the Jewish Colonization Society to subvent schools where English would be taught. Nestorians should also be encouraged. Ibid., February, 1913.

[3] 'Give the Tigris and Euphrates escapes into the deserts, and Babylon will again rival Egypt and the railways will be one of the best paying concerns in the world.' Willcocks, Sir W., *Near East*, June 6th, 1913.

[4] *Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1913.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

175
64

these special interests in Turkish Arabia, although she was not willing to recognize the full British claims. The process of reconciling the differences between the two Powers was restricted by the necessity of bringing Germany and Turkey into agreement, of considering the wishes of France, Italy and Russia, and of finding compensations for them in order to avoid that obsession of the early twentieth century: a general European war. Not until June 15th, 1914, was a treaty initialled, subject to ratification, following the conclusion of separate Turco-German negotiations.

By the terms of the agreement,[1] Germany abandoned all hope of a port in her own name on the Persian Gulf. She secured, however, cessation of obstruction to the Baghdad Railway, the recognition of her own special spheres in Anatolia, North Syria and northern Mesopotamia, in exchange for recognition of Great Britain's dominant position in southern Mesopotamia and in the Persian Gulf. The terminus of the Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, any further construction to be made only after a complete agreement had been previously reached by the Ottoman, German and British Governments. Both Powers were to observe strictly the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of July 29th, 1913, together with the agreement between Lord Inchcape and the Baghdad Railway Company regarding important navigation rights, port and terminal facilities on the Tigris and Euphrates and the agreement between the Smyrna-Aidin Railway and the Baghdad Railway regarding important extensions to the former line. As an essential preliminary to the negotiations regarding the transfer of the Turkish oilfields to a British controlled company, the German Government was forced, in March, 1914, to recognize southern Mesopotamia as well as central and southern Persia as the exclusive fields of operation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and, in addition, to agree to the construction of a railway from Kūt al-'Amāra to Mandalī in order to facilitate the shipment of

[1] *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1923, pp. 29 ff.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

petroleum. Both Germany and Great Britain undertook to observe their respective interests in the irrigation of the Cilician plain and lower Mesopotamian valley.

Thus, on the eve of the World War, Great Britain's long tenure as the dominant European Power in Turkish Arabia and the Persian Gulf was about to enter a new phase. Three centuries of British efforts to extend and to protect trade had culminated, through the new concessions contained in the negotiated Agreements, in fresh opportunities for British capital, talent and products in the development of irrigation, of navigation, of the ports of Basra and Baghdad and in the anticipated increase in prosperity of Turkish Arabia. A share of the potential riches of the petroleum fields of Kirkûk had also been won for British exploitation.

Even more important, the long series of British activities in the Persian Gulf and in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys: the suppression of pirates, the establishment of suzerainty over Arab chiefs of the Gulf, the surveys and investigations for river and railway communication projects, and the initiation of diplomatic and military measures, all of which had been successfully directed towards protecting trade and forestalling other powers from reaching the Gulf and thus menacing India, had broken the force of the latest and most dangerous of the attempts to disturb the *status quo* in Persian Gulf regions. Great Britain's claim to special consideration and position in south-west Asia had achieved recognition both by the Powers and by Turkey itself. She had, in effect, with their consent, completed the peaceful annexation of the Persian Gulf as an Indian Lake and the establishment of her special position in the Mesopotamian wilayets of the Ottoman Empire.

The agreements, however, had not been all pure gain for Great Britain. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway was to have its outlet to the Gulf. Germany, although greatly restricted, was to be admitted into the hitherto jealously guarded Garden of Eden. Nor was there any guarantee as to how long the new

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MH Iraq MH

175* 648 relations could be expected to last. In the face of previous successes in hitherto British markets already won by German commercial rivals and of the bellicose attitude and unfriendly actions of Germans, within the few months following the initialling of the Anglo-German Agreement, it is not too much to conjecture that the agreement might have been, in reality, only an uneasy truce.

It may be reasonably doubted whether these breaches in Great Britain's traditional policy would ever have taken place, whether the negotiations themselves would ever have been necessary, or whether Great Britain would have been forced to suffer nearly 100,000 casualties[1] or to sacrifice £200,000,000[2] in a war in Turkish Arabia had she taken the early opportunities repeatedly offered her of building the trans-Mesopotamian railroad. Had she built the railroad, the wilayets of Baghdad and Basra would probably have taken on the status of Egypt before the war, owing nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan but under the protection of Great Britain. Had there not been the opportunity for economic and political expansion in Turkish Arabia to draw Germany onwards, the latter might never have sought and acquired her predominating influence at the Sublime Porte, without which Turkey would have never entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Without the stimulus of Allied war-time promises of independence, Arab nationalism would not have risen in such power for at least another decade, the Sharifians would not have gained their chance at leadership, and the creation of the kingdom of 'Iraq might have been delayed to the dim future.

Whatever the new relations between Turkey, Germany and Great Britain in Turkish Arabia and the Persian Gulf might have been as the result of their agreements, it was clear, immediately on the outbreak of war in Europe that the whole

[1] Casualties from all sources in the Mesopotamia Campaign were 92,501, according to *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 331; 98,038, according to Robertson, Sir William, *Soldiers and Statesmen* (2 vols., 1926), Vol. II, p. 82.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. 132 (1922), p. 1546.

6;Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

situation had been thrown once again into the melting pot. All for which Great Britain had striven, consciously or unconsciously, for nearly three hundred years was now in danger of being swept away. The whole history of the part played by Great Britain in the Middle East made it inevitable, once resort to arms had begun, that she should make some effort, not only to maintain that which she had won but also to secure, once and for all, by the establishment of political control, the Mesopotamian portion of the land route to India.

175
645

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

accordance with Indian practice for every aspect of life within the division, was extended and the hierarchy of officials increased from 1918 to 1920. The very titles borne in India, Civil Commissioner, Political Officer, Assistant Political Officer, Revenue Officer, Judicial Officer and others were reproduced in the 'Iraq administration.[1]

Whether or not the Acting Civil Commissioner desired to extend the Indian system or not, the shadow of India was over him at all times. Such administrative practices as he had learned by 1914, when at the age of thirty he was inducted into the political service in Mesopotamia, had been learned in India. His early assistants with a few notable exceptions, had been trained in Indian methods and with a tenacity characteristic of Indian Civil Servants, refused to acknowledge that methods applicable to Indians might not be suitable for Arabs. Officers came from other parts of the Empire but the Indian tradition remained.[2]

Much of the Indian influence on the character of the administration in 'Iraq was undoubtedly due to the fact that India had provided both the motive and the personnel for the Expeditionary Force. The original intention of making Mesopotamia a dependency of India had been given up but the rumour persisted and had to be officially denied.[3] The early suggestion that 'Iraq might provide an outlet for India's surplus population[4] had subsided but had not entirely died out even in official circles.[5] The strongest claim, however, which India

[1] Political Officer H. R. P. Dickson had suggested in 1917 that familiar Arab titles be given to the British officers. *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, 1916-1917, p. 20.

[2] There has been a suggestion of a Civil Service on the lines of the Indian Civil Service, but comprising 'Iraq, the Sudan and the Levant generally Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, March 29th, 1917; also Ormsby Gore, W., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920).

[3] Telegram No. 3070, Balfour, Paris, to Political, Baghdad, February 10th, 1919.

[4] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IV (1917), p. 87.

[5] The Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, writing in February, 1918, in *My Indian Diary* (1930), p. 250, seems to have had in mind some colonizing scheme for Mesopotamia.

6:Ireland 5-5 (no date)1937 MH Iraq MH

and Indian methods had in 'Iraq lay in the interests of the Indian Empire in the future of the country' [1] which it had been bound so long by political and economic ties. The political relation might be severed but those interests had to be safeguarded, as none knew better than the Acting Civil Commissioner. To him, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Asistant Under-Secretary of State for India, who had lent his support to the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force in 914, wrote on March 12th, 1918:

> Entirely different currents are flowing now, and we must shape our course to them if we are to get wat we want in 'Iraq. The old watchwords are obsolete, and the question is how we are to secure what is essential unde the new ones. The thing can be done, but a certain re-orientation is necemary. The 'Arab façade' may have to be something rather more solid than we had originally contemplated.[2]

[1] The recognition of the interests of India in the House of Commons, 'The matter cannot be settled without a great deal of careful study and conference with the Indian authorities and others' (*Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXX (1918), p. 1798), tended to confirm the Arabs in their belief that India might take over 'Iraq. Also *infra*, p. 240.

[2] Cited Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

'IRAQ

'Iraq state stretching from Raqqah on the Euphrates and Jazir ibn 'Umar on Tigris to Basrah and the head waters of the Greater and Lower Zab. This question only arises in Kurdistan, Mosul Wilayet and Dair uz-Zor. But it is of greatest importance. Alternative is establishment of separate state, roughly Mosul Wilayet not under British Protection.

As regards second point the correspondence annexed to this memorandum sufficiently indicates the arguments for and against and the possible alternatives.

As regards third point, answer is of course inseparable from the decision in point two. Here again the correspondence is sufficiently explicit as regards possible choices. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the importance of avoiding the exacerbation of religious differences which might follow upon an indiscreet selection in this connection. . . .

As soon as you conveniently can after the receipt of this letter, you should discuss the questions raised therein confidentially with the principal personalities in your area, and ascertain from them what the trend of public opinion is likely to be, and inform me accordingly.

When public opinion appears likely, under the guidance of the persons you have consulted, to take a definitely satisfactory line, you are authorized to convene an assembly of all leading notables and shaikhs with a view to placing before them the above questions, informing them that their answers will be communicated to me for submission to Government. When public opinion appears likely to be sharply divided or in the unlikely event of its being unfavourable, you should defer holding a meeting and report to me for instructions.

In such cases, it may be anticipated that the favourable verdict of neighbouring districts will tend to have a favourable effect in forming public opinion.

When opinion is favourable, it is desirable it should be reduced to writing and signed by as many as possible.[1]

The task of conducting the plebiscite presented grave difficulties, of which the Acting Civil Commissioner as Chief

[1] Memorandum 27190, Civil Commissioner to Political Officers, Baghdad, November 30th, 1918.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

CHAPTER IX

THE PLEBISCITE OF 1918-1919

In obtaining 'the views held by the local population',[1] the Acting High Commissioner believed that the extension of the plebiscite to the rank and file of the inhabitants was both impracticable and unnecessary. The masses were too illiterate, too ignorant and dependent on their leaders to merit consideration. The garden cultivators and date growers of the Tigris and the Euphrates, the orange growers of Ba'qūbā, the shepherds of the Dulaim, the rice cultivators of Diwānīya and Shāmīya, the marsh dwellers of 'Amāra and Qurna, the tribesmen throughout the land and the townsmen of little substance were regarded as having neither opinions of their own nor ability to form them other than as echoes at the behest of their religious and secular leaders. The attention of the Civil Administration was therefore directed to those elements of the population who by position and by character were presumed to be favourable to continued British control, and whose opinions might be put forward as representative.

In the tribal districts and in small towns the plebiscite was confined to the shaikhs and land-owning dignitaries, called together in assemblies where they gave their declarations under their seals and signatures. Among the shaikhs, dependent on the British for support of their position,[2] for possession of their lands, as at 'Amāra, or for their highly-prized subsidies,[3] and

[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 29th, 1918. Cmd, *supra*, p. 161.

[2] During the troubles of 1920, many shaikhs were forced into the towns, as they had no power to maintain themselves otherwise over their tribes.

[3] As in Diwānīya Division, where every shaikh until 1920 received a subsidy from the Civil Administration.

SEARCH FOR A BUSSE

the Cairo Conference in March, most of the [illegible] between H.M. Government and the [illegible] It remained for the Cairo Conference to [illegible] ture and to outline the procedure by which he was to be installed in 'Iraq.

The Cairo Conference, March [illegible]

The Middle East Division of the Colonial Office [illegible] its creation to the necessity of devising a [illegible] policy for the Near and Middle East and of [illegible] control the complicated and [illegible] authority among the Foreign, the [illegible] Offices.[1] Mr. Churchill, in taking charge of [illegible] East affairs, was faced, on the one hand, by the [illegible] demand of the British public for a [illegible] ture[2] and, on the other hand, by the [illegible] whole political creed was to [illegible] consolidating the territorial gains and the [illegible] points won in the East as the result of a [illegible] blood and treasure. To aid in formulating [illegible] cedure in order to achieve these ends, he [illegible] of the principal political and military officials of the [illegible] concerned to meet in Cairo on March [illegible]

The questions considered by the Conference [illegible] problems concerning 'Iraq: the [illegible] expenditure with the consequent [illegible] (a) the future relationship of the new State to Great Britain

[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., [illegible]

[2] Ibid., Vol. [illegible] L., Vol. [illegible] *Daily Telegraph*, June [illegible]

[3] The representatives of 'Iraq who were [illegible] the High Commissioner, [illegible] the Commander-in-Chief, [illegible] C.M.G., D.S.O., Minister of Defence [illegible] C.M.G., C.I.E., Adviser to the Ministry of Wealth [illegible] Financial Adviser, Miss Gertrude Bell, [illegible]

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MSS Iraq MSS

(*b*) the person of the future ruler of 'Iraq; and (*c*) the nature and composition of the defence forces of the new State which was to assume an increasing share of its own defence. The status of the Kurdish regions in their relations to 'Iraq was also discussed.

It was apparent, in view of the decreasing revenue, of falling agricultural prices and of the large burdens to be assumed in taking over the Railways, the Port of Basra and other public works from the Army at the latter's own valuation, that the prospects were not bright for the immediate assumption by the new State of the cost of its defence. Anticipating a discussion of the question, vital from the British standpoint, at Cairo, the High Commissioner after consultation with Sir Aylmer Haldane and the Minister of Defence had, nevertheless, formulated proposals involving substantial saving for the ensuing year and further reductions in the future, consequent on 'Iraq assuming an increasing share in the responsibilities hitherto devolving on Great Britain.[1] Mr. Churchill was thus able to announce a preliminary reduction of the original estimate of British expenditure in the Middle East for 1921-2, from £35,000,000 to £27,500,000, a figure which was expected to fall to nine or ten million pounds in 1922-3.[2] The reduction in the British budget, however, necessitated a stipulation that the 'Iraq budget should provide not less than 55 lacs for the National Army, the strength of which should eventually amount to 15,000 men, and that ordinarily her contributions to defence should not fall below 15 per cent of her revenue,[3] a proportion later increased to 25 per cent.[4]

[1] Cox, Sir P. Z. 'Historical Summary' in Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), p. 871. Also *ibid.*, Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1347. The actual expenditures in 'Iraq by the British Treasury, 1920-3 have been stated to be (*ibid.*, Vol. CXCII (1926), p. 4):

1920-1	£32,000,000	1923-4	£3,740,358
1921-2	£23,333,050	1924-5	£4,479,734
1922-3	£7,807,384	1925-6	£4,118,400

[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 25.

[4] Article IV of Military Agreement and Article IV of Financial Agreement, subsidiary to the Treaty with King Faisal, October 10th, 1922, Cmd. 2120.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MIII Iraq MIII

SEARCH FOR A RULER

In order to enable the High Commissioner to achieve the proposed economies for the relief of the British taxpayer, the Conference agreed that until the 'Iraqi Army could be recruited, equipped and trained, the Levies should be increased from 4000 to 7500 and that they were to be financed by H.M. Government and to be administered by the High Commissioner. The Levies, hitherto, had been composed for the most part of Arabs, with a small number of Kurds. Assyrians were now to be recruited.[1] In addition, six squadrons of the Air Force, stationed at strategic points, were to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order.[2]

The success of the proposed withdrawal of British troops from 'Iraq depended almost entirely on the creation and maintenance of friendly relations between the 'Iraqis and the Mandatory Power, which had been temporarily improved by the establishment of the provisional Government. The continuance of strong Nationalist agitation, however, directed against the Mandate on the ground that the relationship which it created had no basis either in British promises or in Arab Nationalism, seemed to indicate that the mandatory regime, as originally conceived and outlined in the draft document, could not be imposed without prolonged military occupation on a scale which British public opinion rendered impossible. The mere prospect of increased hostility, leading inevitably in the absence of adequate military forces in the country to disturbances similar to those of 1920 or even worse, would not only paralyse the efforts of British officials to apply the Mandate and to develop the country but would also lead to an irresistible renewal of British public opinion for the complete evacuation of a country where the game was not worth the candle.

It had already been suggested to H.M. Government, in May, 1920, by Mr. Montagu, that if Nationalist agitation were to

[1] *Admin. Report, 1920–1922*, pp. 44–5.

[2] Samuson, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip, *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. xx (1933), p. 309.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

175 727 643 648

be cut at its roots and if a friendly government co-operating with Great Britain were to be established in 'Iraq, a further step in defining the relations between the two countries might be necessary.[1] This step would consist of an attempt to satisfy national aspirations by disguising the relationship, sanctioned under the terms of the mandatory document then already in existence, by means of a treaty of alliance. Lord Curzon, who had difficulty in agreeing with Mr. Montagu on any subject, had rejected the suggestion at the time. Mr. Churchill took up the idea, all his conversations with Amir Faisal being conducted on the basis of negotiating a treaty similar to that between Great Britain and Egypt, which would establish Faisal as King of an independent State in alliance with Great Britain. Under such a treaty, the scope of British authority might be more restricted than originally projected, but under skilful handling, the ultimate authority could be made not less effective. It would have the added merit of enabling Great Britain to maintain with less expense her position before the League of Nations without sacrificing her Imperial interests.

When Mr. Churchill arrived at Cairo for the Conference, he had made up his mind that Faisal was the only possible candidate with whom such a treaty might be negotiated. In agreement with him were Sir Percy Cox and many friends and supporters of the Amir at the Conference: T. E. Lawrence, Miss Bell, Ja'far Pasha, H. W. Young, and others. Amir Faisal's high birth, as a son of Husain, Sharif of Mecca and King of the Hijāz, assured his position among Arabs in general and gave his person a sanctity among the religiously minded, even among the Shī'is. He possessed experience in the ways of men and in diplomatic usage gleaned from his early life among the Turks at Istanbul, from his sojourn in the desert in the days of peace and of war against the Turks, from his participation at the Peace Conference at Versailles and from his brief day as King at Damascus. Among the Nationalists, his early

[1] Young, Major Sir H. W., op. cit., p. 313.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

espousal of the Arab cause in Syria,[1] his leadership of the Arab forces in the Hijāz and in Syria and his election as the first Arab ruler of Damascus since the Ummayads, secured his standing as an Arab patriot. His personality and his character which had won and were to continue to win the affection of British officials with whom he associated, were expected to gain the adherence of the 'Iraqis among whom a strong sentiment in his favour already existed.

His short-lived kingship at Damascus, it was believed, had revealed to him the difficulties of a purely Arab administration and the danger of relying entirely on an Arab army.[2] British advice and assistance to the new kingdom would, therefore, it was hoped, be welcomed for their own sake and be regarded not merely as onerous conditions imposed by the Power which had given him his throne.

As a secondary consideration, it was felt that Faisal's nomination would, in part, redeem the promises made during the war to the Sharīf in particular and to the Arabs in general and thus rehabilitate British prestige in the Arab world. It would, in addition, mitigate Faisal's bitterness against the British Government for what he believed to be its responsibility in his overthrow at Damascus.[3]

Mr. Churchill believed, moreover, that if Faisal were installed in 'Iraq, the British Government would acquire increased control both over him and over his father, the Sharīf of Mecca, who was still proving intractable and exasperating in his relations with Great Britain. At a meeting of the Special

[1] His efforts to secure the release of the Syrians accused of treason during the war nearly cost him his own life. See Djemal Pasha, op. cit., pp. 217-18.

[2] Amīr Faisal, in his unpublished Memoirs, written during his sojourn in Italy in 1920, spoke, however, in glowing terms of his own Arab forces of the desert campaign, and declared that had they fought at Maisalun the French would not have won the engagement.

[3] In his *Memoirs*, Amīr Faisal maintained, not always correctly, that he had followed faithfully the advice of his British Advisers in all his relations with the French, relying on the help which they promised; that they had discouraged his summoning of his Hijāzī followers; and that in the crucial hour of his need, they had abandoned him to the French.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Committee dealing with the question of a ruler for 'Iraq, on the opening day of the Conference, March 12th, Mr. Churchill declared that Faisal should be made to realize that his father's subsidy as well as the British guarantee to the Sharif of non-aggression from Wahhábí sources depended on Faisal's own behaviour.

Although the approval of Amir Faisal's candidature was almost a foregone certainty, the merits of the other candidates were not overlooked at the Conference. The High Commissioner, speaking on March 12th, did not believe that any local candidate could be elected. The Agha Khan, whose interests had become European rather than Asiatic, would not accept the nomination. Sentiment for a Turkish Prince was not strong enough to be considered. By the process of elimination as well as by his own merits, Faisal appeared to be the only possible candidate.

The difficulties attending the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq were not ignored. Warning notes were sounded as to the undoubted opposition of Saiyid Talib Pasha to any nominee other than himself[1] and as to the probable effect on Ibn Sa'úd, an ally of Great Britain, of the establishment of the two new Háshimí kingdoms: 'Iraq on the north and Transjordan on the north-west. To counter possible active hostility from Ibn Sa'úd who had already shown interest in the political situation in 'Iraq, the Conference resolved that he should be acquainted with the attitude of H.M. Government to Faisal's candidature. The High Commissioner, accordingly, telegraphed to the Wahhábí leader shortly after the Conference had adjourned. He received in reply a letter, dated May 7th, 1921, expressing Ibn Sa'úd's thanks for the consideration shown him at the Conference.[2] After Faisal's departure for 'Iraq and Mr. Churchill's

[1] Expected to take the form of anti-Mandate agitation.

[2] Kohn's statement, *History of Nationalism in the Near East*, p. 308, that the effect on Ibn Sa'úd of the setting up of the Háshimí princes was overlooked by the British Government, is not borne out by the records of the Cairo Conference. See *Parl. Debates, H. of C.*, Vol. CXLIII (1921), pp. 283 ff. Also *supra*, p. 157.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

announcement, Ibn Sa'ūd again wrote, on June 21st, to the High Commissioner stating his willingness to accept the decision of the British Government, but asking that his own position be determined and safeguarded. Some time afterwards he replied in friendly terms to a message from Faisal.[1]

A further question arose at the Conference as to whether an 'Iraqi Congress or Assembly should propose Faisal as King. It was pointed out by a member of the special Committee that a concrete proposal must be placed before the Assembly if it were convened or the results of its deliberations would not be satisfactory. Mr. Churchill stated that he knew of no precedent for allowing a Constituent Assembly to choose its own ruler. It was eventually agreed that convocation of the Assembly before the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq was undesirable but that the High Commissioner should use his discretion according to the situation existing at the time. It was also agreed, in order that 'Iraq should appear to choose its own ruler, that a line of procedure should be followed which would give the 'Iraqis the opportunity of demanding Amir Faisal. The following schedule was provisionally proposed:

April 18th — The High Commissioner would arrive in Baghdad.

April 18th to 21st — Announcement by the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs that H.M. Government approved of Amir Faisal as a candidate for the throne of 'Iraq. This would be accompanied by a proclamation of a general amnesty issued by the High Commissioner.

April 23rd — Amir Faisal would send telegrams to Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'id, to Talib Pasha and to the Naqib of Baghdad

[1] Letter, Ibn Sa'ūd to Amir Faisal, July 29th, 1921:

After compliments, etc., 'We thank God for your safety and beg that you will be always safe. May you prosper.

'There is no doubt that you are fit to be the foremost in good action as is proved by the capacity you have shown in solving difficulties and maintaining mutual support for the upkeep of the glory of the Arabs. You may be sure that your brother has no thought nor aspiration other than this.'

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announcing his candidature and saying that he, Faisal, hoped that he would have their co-operation.

April 23rd to May 8th — Nūrī Pasha and other 'Iraqis would send telegrams to Amīr Faisal, inviting him to come to 'Iraq as its prospective King.

May 8th to June 8th — Amīr Faisal would come to 'Iraq or would send his representatives, the arrival to take place about the middle of May. He or his representatives would be met by such a welcome and response from 'Iraqis as to make it unnecessary to convene the Constituent Assembly, except to ratify or to confirm his election as King.

This schedule, finally adopted after minor alterations as to details and dates, implied that the Amīr should come to agreement with H.M. Government in regard to the future treaty, to Great Britain's position in 'Iraq and towards the League of Nations and to his own position generally.[1] It also implied that the Sharifian party in Baghdad, stimulated by the announcement of approval by H.M. Government and by judicious promptings emanating from the British Residency, would prove to be sufficiently representative and powerful to merit the invitation to the Amīr to come to 'Iraq where he could appear only when the ground had been carefully ploughed and harrowed.

[1] *Progress of 'Iraq during the Period 1920–1931* (Special Report by H.M. Government to Council of League of Nations, Colonial No. 58 (1931)) (hereafter *Progress of 'Iraq*), p. 14.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

Organic Law and to ensure religious and educational freedom, contained in Articles One and Eight of the Mandate, were thus reproduced in Article III of the Treaty,[1] with the additional proviso that the Organic Law should prescribe constitutional procedure within the country.

Article V of the Treaty replaced Article Three of the Mandate providing, in terms suitable to the regime, for 'Iraqi representatives abroad, and for representation of foreign Powers in 'Iraq, subject to the approval of His Britannic Majesty. Article VII of the Treaty reproduced Article Four of the Mandate, which had forbidden the ceding or leasing of 'Iraq territory. Article IX noted the non-application of immunities under the capitulations, which Article Five of the Mandate had definitely abrogated. Article VIII also contained the first section of Article Six, providing for the establishment of a judicial system to safeguard the interests of foreigners. The King of 'Iraq now agreed to 'accept and give effect to such reasonable provisions as His Britannic Majesty may consider necessary in judicial matters'. Article XI reproduced almost exactly that section of Article Eleven of the mandatory document which had ensured economic equality in the mandated territory to all members of the League. One important addition was made, however. A new clause extended economic equality to 'any State to which His Britannic Majesty has agreed by treaty that the same rights should be ensured as if it were a member of the said League'. This addition had its origin in the satisfactory termination of the Colby-Curzon correspondence over the 'Open Door' principle in mandated territories.[2]

The final section of Article Eleven, which had sanctioned the arrangement of a Customs union with other Arab States,

[1] Numbers written in full are employed throughout in reference to the mandatory document (Cmd. 1500); Roman numerals refer to articles of the Treaty of 1922. Ibid., 1922 (Cmd. 1757), iv, 769.

[2] Ibid., 1921 (Cmd. 1226), xliii, 1181; 1921 (Cmd. 1351), xliii, 495; U.S. Senate Document No. 97, Oil Concessions in Foreign Countries, 68th Congress, 1st session, p. 55; Gerig, op. cit., pp. 140–1, 143–4.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

together and on March 24th had pledged themselves to support the Treaty and to take no other action without common consent.

Discordant elements, however, both inside and outside the Assembly, soon began to make themselves felt. In the Assembly, a group, of which Yāsīn Pasha, Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī and Muzāhim Pāchahjī were leaders, opposed the Treaty and the Agreements on the grounds that they limited independence, that the Agreements, particularly the British Official and Financial Agreements, were more than the country could bear, and that they did not in return assure adequate support for 'Iraq, especially in the Mōsul frontier dispute. The party's vigorous advocacy of these arguments, particularly the last two, with which even supporters of the Treaty were in sympathy, drew many of the wavering deputies to their side.

Another group was formed, theoretically in opposition to the Treaty but in reality, it was maintained in official circles, in opposition to the Cabinet, whose fall it hoped to bring about. Still another group, led by Ra'ūf Beg Chādarchī, opposed the Treaty on technical grounds, alleging that in form it was not a treaty which could be honourably signed by two nations. It was merely the Mandate re-written.[1]

In addition, a large section of the tribal representatives, led by Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn of the Muntafiq, broke away from the tribal group, declaring that it would not agree to ratification unless the Organic Law guaranteed the shaikhs special privileges: increased use of the Tribal Disputes Regulations, the perpetual lease of government lands then held by the shaikhs and consultation with a tribal *majlis* of twelve shaikhs of any *Liwā* where martial law was about to be declared.

Outside the Assembly, where the sole subject of conversation was the Treaty, the religious leaders, the lawyers and law students, school teachers and Nationalists generally, including the young leaders of the *Ma'hadā'l 'Ilmī* and the *Nadī'l 'Islāh*,

[1] Such was the tenor of Ra'ūf Beg's speech, June 2nd: *Mashrūtah*, 15th session, pp. 300 ff.

645 669 Sulaimān, both ardent Turcophiles,[1] caused less resentment than might have been supposed, in spite of the bombardment of Baghdad, the murder of Ja'far Pasha and of Dhia Yūnis,[2] Secretary of the former Council of Ministers, and the expulsions of many 'Iraqīs held to be capable of raising opposition.

645 185 [207] Much favourable sentiment was won by the new Government by its promises issued through the press,[3] and for the first time in the history of 'Iraq, by means of the radio[4]: distribution of land to the tribes and the *fallahīn* individually, amnesties,[5] freedom of the press[6] and of election, and by an all-inclusive programme of administrative reforms ranging from prisons to revenue collection. The promises, however, even if not cast into a twenty-five point programme, have the familiar ring of similar programmes advanced by other Governments to win popular support and to justify the means by which they have come to power.

645 648 The goodwill of H.B.M. Government has apparently been won also by assurances of friendship to Great Britain and of loyalty to treaty relations as well as toleration for minorities,[7] although individual members of the new 'Iraq government have long been noted for their anti-British and anti-minority views. The new regime seems to have realized as have other 'Iraqī Governments in the past and as all others must in the future that, whatever the internal political changes, order must be maintained and that commerce, oil-production, and air-routes must not be disturbed.

[1] One of Hikmat Sulaimān's first official acts was to announce that he would visit Ankara to cement Turco-'Iraqī friendship and to observe Turkish reforms for possible introduction into 'Iraq.

[2] On the same day, January 21st, 1937, that Yāsīn Pasha al-Hāshimī died suddenly of heart-failure in Bairūt.

[3] *The Times*, November 7th, 1936; *Al-Bulāgh*, December 14th, 1936.

[4] November 9th, 1936, by Hikmat Sulaimān and Ja'far abū Timman.

[5] According to the *Palestine Post*, November 11th, 1936, 200 prisoners concerned in the tribal rebellions of 1935 were released.

[6] *Al-Ayyām*, November 10th, 1936, reported the appearance of six new journals in Baghdad. Four others, however, *Al-Tarīq*, *Al-'Uqāb*, *Al-Istiqlāl*, of Baghdad and *Ar-Nās*, of Basrah, were suspended later for periods ranging from 12 days to one year for articles in opposition to the new regime.

[7] See *The Times*, November 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 1936.

1 - [1936 .. Analyst]

cases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high.

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fellahin* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan may take 'Iraqi wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.' The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[1]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically non-existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, have been under consideration for some time. The Department of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqi labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.[2]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

[1] *G.B. and I.*, March 10th, 1937. [2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.
[3] *G.B. and I.*, December 26th, 1935.

'IRAQ

175 have had little effect on British policy. Although agreeing to the
185 progressive restatement of its relations with 'Iraq, the British
727 Government diminished no whit of its insistence that its advice, through the High Commissioner and the British officials, be taken; that its assistance, as outlined in the Treaty and the Agreements, be employed; and that its will as the mandatory Power be the ultimate authority.

175 If the formal relinquishment, October, 1932, by Great
185 Britain of her right to control the affairs of 'Iraq except in accordance with the Treaty and Agreements still in force, marked another stage in 'Iraq's political existence, the work of development has not been completed. In the continued reorganization of finances, in the perfection of the Judicial system, in the raising of education standards, and in the extension of agriculture, irrigation and means of communication still lie much to be done. Hopeful signs of governmental action would seem to appear in the current version of the frequently altered Five Year Capital Works Plan with its provision for irrigation projects, roads, bridges, 150 schools and numerous health centres,[1] in the proposed Health Campaign,[2] and in the recently created Agricultural Bank,[3] and in the many new proposals laid before the Chamber by the new Government.

[LVI] 'Iraq's recent treaty of friendship with Sa'ûdî Arabia, April 2nd, 1936,[4] and her amiable relations with Turkey seem to point to the removal of these two external dangers. Within the country still lie the problems of the creation of a social class of citizens, now beginning to appear, capable and willing to assume political duties from a sense of public duty and not of personal aggrandizement, the evolution of a free Press motivated by public spirit rather than by individual or party grievances, the assurance of free elections, and the elimination of sectarian and sectional animosities which will eradicate the antipathies between tribesmen and townsmen, will bring the Shî'îs into

[1] G.B. and E., April 9th, 23rd, 1936.
[2] N.E. and J., August 8th, 22nd, 1932.
[3] G.B. and E., March 26th, 1936.
[4] Text ibid., April 23rd, 1936.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

APPENDIX I

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GENERAL MAUDE'S PROCLAMATION[1]

To the People of the Baghdad Vilayet

In the name of my King and in the name of the peoples over whom he rules, I address you as follows:

Our military operations have as their object the defeat of the enemy and the driving of him from these territories. In order to complete this task I am charged with absolute and supreme control of all regions in which British Forces operate, but our Armies have not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors, or enemies, but as Liberators.

Since the days of Hulaku your Citizens have been subject to the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have fallen into ruins, your gardens have sunken in desolation and your forefathers and yourselves have groaned in bondage. Your sons have been carried off to wars not of your seeking, your wealth has been stripped from you by unjust men and squandered in distant places.

Since the days of Midhat Pasha the Turks have talked of reforms yet do not the ruins and wastes of to-day testify to the vanity of those promises?

It is the wish, not only of my King and his peoples, but is also the wish of the Great Nations with whom he is in alliance, that you should prosper, even as in the past, when your lands were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science and art and Baghdad was one of the wonders of the world.

Between your people and the Dominions of my King there has been a close bond of interest and for 200 years have the Merchants of Baghdad and Great Britain traded together in mutual profit and friendship. On the other hand, the Germans and Turks, who have despoiled you and yours, have for twenty years made Baghdad a centre of power from which to assail the power of the British and the Allies of the British in Persia and Arabia. Therefore, the British Government cannot remain indifferent as to what takes place in your country, now or in the future, for, in duty to the interests of the British people and their Allies, the British Government cannot risk

[1] *Proclamations*, 1914-1919, Proclamation No. 9, pp. 5-6.

62Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MH Iraq MH

648 that being done in Baghdad again which has been done by the Turks and Germans during the war.

But you, the people of Baghdad, whose commercial professions and whose safety from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter of the closest concern to the British Government, are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government, to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realised once again. The people of Baghdad shall flourish and enjoy their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. In the Hejaz the Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans who oppressed them and have proclaimed Sharif Husain as their King and His Lordship rules in independence and freedom and is the ally of the Nations who are fighting against the power of Turkey and Germany. So, indeed, are the noble Arabs, the Lords of Nejd, Koweit and Asir.

Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause of freedom at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the Great Powers allied to Great Britain that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the desire and hope of the British people and Nations in alliance with them that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown amongst the peoples of the Earth and that it shall bind itself to this and in unity and concord.

O! People of Baghdad. Remember that for twenty-six generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another in order that they might profit by your dissensions. Therefore, I am commanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army so that you may unite with your kinsmen in the North, East, South and West in realizing the aspirations of your race.

Army Headquarters,
Baghdad

F. S. Maude, Lieut.-General,
Commanding British Forces
in 'Iraq

The 19th March, 1917
(24th Jumâ-al-Awal, 1335)

Ireland S-3 (no date)1937 MH Iraq MH

APPENDICES

APPENDIX II

BALFOUR DECLARATION[1]

648

2 November, 1917

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

APPENDIX III

PRESIDENT WILSON'S TWELFTH POINT[2]

8 January, 1918

Point XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

APPENDIX IV

THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION[3]

The end which France and Great Britain have in view in their prosecution in the East of the war let loose by German ambition is

[1] From facsimile of original letter, Stein, *op. cit.*
[2] *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, Vol. CXI (1918), p. 959 ff.
[3] *Proclamations, 1914-1919*, Proclamation No. 31, November 8th, 1918, p. 21.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MH Iraq MH

641 the complete and definitive liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations.

In order to give effect to these intentions France and Great Britain are agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, which have already in fact been liberated by the Allies, and in countries whose liberation they are endeavouring to effect, and to recognize the latter as soon as they shall be effectively established. Far from wishing to impose any particular institution on these lands, they have no other care but to assure by their support and effective aid the normal working of the Governments and Administrations, which they shall have adopted of their free will. To ensure impartial and equal justice, to facilitate economic development by evoking and encouraging indigenous initiative, to foster the spread of education and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy — such is the rôle which the two allied Governments assume in the liberated territories.

APPENDIX V

642 ## TENTATIVE DRAFT OF ARAB INSTITUTIONS[1]

Central Government

Arab Ministers with English Advisers.

Say: For Interior, Finance, Justice, Education, Public Works, Commerce or Agriculture(?), Waqf(?).

Council of Ministers

Consisting of Arab Ministers and Advisers.

To be the Supreme Legislative body for the whole country.

No elected legislative body at present.

Local Government

English Commissioners — Arab Deputy Commissioners or vice versa.

[1] Memorandum by Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, Baghdad, 1919.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

assistance as a younger brother demands from an elder, as a freeman from a freeman, not as a slave from a master, but as a friend from a friend. 643

'I am the friend of the British, and I ask the nation to hold towards them the friendship of the free to the free.'

APPENDIX VIII

H.M. KING FAISAL'S ACCESSION

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(Telegrams Exchanged on the Occasion of)

(i) *Telegram from H.M. King George V to H.M. King Faisal*[1]

'I offer Your Majesty my sincere congratulations on this historical and moving occasion when by the overwhelming vote of the people of 'Iraq the ancient city of Baghdad has once again become the seat of an Arab Kingdom. It is a source of deep gratification to myself and my people that combined military effort of British and Arab forces and those of their Allies has culminated in this memorable event. The treaty which will shortly be concluded between us to consecrate the alliance into which we entered during the dark days of the war, will, I am confident, enable me to fulfil my solemn obligations by inaugurating an era of peace and renewed prosperity for 'Iraq.'

(Signed) GEORGE, R.I.

(ii) *Telegram in reply from H.M. King Faisal*

'I am profoundly touched and greatly rejoice at the Royal and gracious favour which you have extended towards me and towards my people in Your Majesty's message.

'On this auspicious day when Baghdad the city of the Khalifs has become for the second time the capital of an Arab Kingdom, I recall with pride how white has been the hand of Your Majesty and Your noble people in the achievement of Arab aspirations. I am confident that the Arab Nation will justify Your Majesty's

[1] *Iraq Admin. Report, October, 1920, to March, 1922*, pp. 9-10.

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reliance on the success of their efforts to regain their pristine glory provided that they continue to enjoy the support and friendship of Great Britain. I doubt not that the treaty which will be concluded between us, will strengthen the bonds of alliance already cemented with the mingled blood of Briton and Arab on the battle-fields of the Great War and that it will be established on unshakeable foundation.

'Finally, I wish Your Majesty and your honoured Nation continued prosperity and enduring glory.'

(Signed) FAISAL

APPENDIX IX

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PROTOCOL OF 30 APRIL, 1923

(To the Treaty with King Faisal, Signed 10 October, 1922)[1]

We, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of His BRITANNIC MAJESTY and of His MAJESTY the KING of 'IRAQ respectively, having been duly authorized, met together this 30th day of April, 1923, corresponding to the Ramazan, 1341, in order to sign the following Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance concluded between Their Majesties aforesaid on the 10th of October, 1922, corresponding to 19th Sa'far, 1341, Hijrah, subject to ratification.

PROTOCOL

It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 18, the present Treaty shall terminate upon 'Iraq becoming a Member of the League of Nations and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey. Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a fresh agreement from being concluded with a view to regulating the subsequent relations between them before the expiration of the above period.

IN WITNESS OF WHICH the respective Plenipotentiaries have affixed their signatures thereto. Done at Baghdad in duplicate this

[1] Cmd. 2120.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

thirtieth day of April; one thousand nine hundred and twenty-three of the Christian Era, corresponding with the fourteenth day of Ramazan, one thousand three hundred and forty-one, Hijrah. 418

P. Z. Cox
His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in 'Iraq

Abdul Muhsin al Sa'adun
Prime Minister of the 'Iraq Government

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

already existing water shortage in the Kut and Amara regions in southern Iraq would become more acute. Its construction is all the more urgent because the Wadi Tharthar reservoir will not supply supplementary water for the Tigris for another decade at best. In fact, some geologists believe that loss of water in the reservoir may be such that little or no water for irrigation will ever be furnished by the Wadi Tharthar. Should the Wadi Tharthar ultimately prove able to supply water for irrigation, the water impounded by the Bekhme dam could be utilized for the irrigation of the Erbil plain in northern Iraq.

Completion of the final stage of the Habbaniya project calls for the storage in the Abu Dibis and related depressions of water in excess of the expanded capacity of Habbaniya Lake and, in theory, would also permit a substantial extension of irrigation in the Euphrates Valley. Further study is required before beginning this stage of that project, however, because there is great danger that the salt in the depression may make the water unfit for irrigation, or at least dangerous to use, until after the completion of drainage facilities for all the areas irrigated from the Euphrates. At the same time the technical possibility of providing alternative storage capacity through the erection of a dam on the upper Euphrates near Ana should be explored.

The irrigation projects outlined above necessitate agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran regarding the conservation and utilization of the water of the Euphrates and the Tigris and their tributaries. An agreement with Syria is particularly urgent, since the extensive irrigation development possible in that country might adversely affect Iraq. With Turkey and Iran it is important to conclude understandings for joint afforestation and other water conservation measures in the watershed of the Tigris and its tributaries. Afforestation and other anti-erosion measures in the international watersheds of the two rivers will effectively complement the flood-control features of the water storage schemes.

In the monograph on irrigation the Mission has given a tentative selection of the irrigation projects which it believes should be initiated to utilize the waters of the new reservoirs. In view of the inadequacy of the information at its disposal, the Mission suggests, however, that its recommendations be reviewed in the light of a

312 653 As a result irrigation in the Lower Tigris basin, particularly in the area served by the Shatt al Gharraf where water is already acutely short, would inevitably suffer in consequence unless water were made available from some alternative source. Although the deficit may be made good from the Wadi Tharthar in the sub, it is by no means certain, as has already been pointed out, that the Wadi Tharthar depression will be able to supply water for irrigation. If the Wadi Tharthar reservoir was ultimately supply the Lower Tigris, it will still be possible to use the water stored within the Bekhme dam for the irrigation of the first plant in the Tigris.

Nor should the cost be regarded as out of proportion to the results that will be achieved. In 1948 Messrs. Frank, Tanghe and Frank and Gwyther estimated the cost of a provide dam to consist at ID 9,000,000, but in 1950 they came to the conclusion that a buttress dam could be built at considerably more cost, namely about ID 6,300,000. The dam would provide a net storage capacity of 1.66 billion cubic meters and would increase the outlet discharge of the river from 120 meters to about 400 meters. This would furnish additional water sufficient to irrigate an area of two million masharas gross. On this area it would be possible to grow winter cereals on 620,000 masharas which might have a total value of ID 3,700,000, assuming conservatively a yield of one quarter of a ton per dunam and a price of ID 40 per ton. If in addition summer crops were grown on one third of the area devoted to winter crops and yielded about the same value per mashara, the total value of the crops grown on the area of two million masharas gross could be put at about ID 5,000,000 per year. The resulting increase in national income would be sufficient for cost of the scheme. Even the tax yield would exceed the cost of amortization.

International Agreements

312 648 The construction of these reservoirs makes it necessary to reach agreements with Syria, Turkey and Iran regarding the control of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris. For the Euphrates this is particularly urgent because half of the course of the river is in Turkish and Syrian territory and nearly all of its basin is in a foreign country. There are irrigation possibilities in Syria which could seriously reduce the flow of water into Iraq. Works which would raise the water level 10 to 20 meters upstream would [illegible]

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

mand an area for irrigation of 1,000,000 to 1,360,000 masharas in Syria. Irrigation of 1,000,000 masharas would require a flow of almost 60 cumecs. In Turkey and Iran the mountainous nature of the watershed of the rivers makes it much less likely that significant quantities of water will be diverted for irrigation. With these countries, however, it will be important to reach agreements regarding joint anti-erosion measures. Such measures will effectively complement water-storage schemes as means of flood control, the more so since silting will otherwise substantially reduce the effective life of reservoirs. Cooperation in afforestation of the watershed areas of these rivers is therefore highly desirable.

At present no such agreements exist. With Syria, there is no accord whatever. With Iran, there is only an old protocol of 1914 governing the use of the waters of a small stream, the Gangir. A protocol annexed to the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness, concluded with Turkey on March 29, 1946, set up a flood-warning service, permitted Iraq to investigate possible sites for flood-control dams in Turkey and gave agreement in principle, subject to confirmation in each case, for construction of works recognized to be necessary. Turkey also undertook to inform Iraq of any contemplated works on any of the two rivers. The scope of the agreement is thus rather limited.

II. Irrigation Works

It is now necessary to consider what irrigation works will be needed to utilize the additional water that will ultimately be made available by the water reservoirs discussed above and what further works should be undertaken to ensure better utilization of water.

Aside from flood control, the most important consequence of the new reservoirs will be the expansion of the area under irrigation. As Table 1 indicates, the area now under irrigation has been estimated by the Haigh Commission at 12,696,000 masharas gross, of which 4,671,000 are irrigated by the waters of the Euphrates and 8,025,000 by those of the Tigris and its tributaries.

8: Kirk
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[For data on international relations and the Iraqi bid for independence and comments on nationalistic movements, see Category 116, pp. 56-78; and 146-159.]

3&Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

175 fluence under Arab rule, the zone between this area and the province of Mosul; the latter was to fall in the French sphere of interest but was included by the Clemenceau–Lloyd George Agreement of December 1918 in the British sphere in exchange for French participation in the north Mesopotamian oil deposits.

British official opinion was divided in its policy towards Iraq. The civil administration in Iraq was for long uncertain whether Iraq, including even the Mosul area, might not be annexed and come under direct rule of the Indian pattern. In the interest of imperial security and administrative efficiency they distrusted the Arab nationalism which had inspired the Arab Revolt in the west. The Arab Bureau in Cairo, on the other hand, favoured Hashimi rule of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The British Government, beset by conflicting advice and embarrassed by its war-time agreements, attempted, through the agency of the administration in the country, to sound Iraqi opinion on the most acceptable form of control.

With the consequent delay in making a definite pronouncement of policy and with practical indications that the administration on the spot was preparing for British rule rather than for Iraqi independence, there was considerable discontent among Iraqi nationalists and pan-Arabists, who consisted chiefly of educated townsmen. Resentment was fanned by Turkish propaganda and by the fiercely enthusiastic Iraqi officers serving with Amir Faisal ibn Hussain in Syria and aggravated by the war-time measures of a foreign, non-Muslim administration. These weighed particularly heavily on the tribal and landowning rural population, especially the Shii tribes of the Middle and Lower Euphrates, who, self-interested rather than strongly nationalist, were assailed by the propaganda of the urban nationalists and the Shii divines of the Holy Cities. The assignment of the Mandate for Iraq to Great Britain at San Remo in 1920 and an attempt at tribal disarmament were followed by disturbances which, in July of that year, developed into an insurrection which, while it left large areas of the country unaffected, required considerable forces to suppress it. It was not completely suppressed till early 1921; but by October 1920 Sir Percy Cox, the first High Commissioner under the mandatory system, had terminated military rule and established an Arab Council of State advised by British officials.

642 By March 1921 the Amir Faisal ibn Hussain, expelled from
648 Damascus by the French the previous year, agreed at the instance of the British Government to accept the throne of Iraq;

3 Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1964 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

his nomination, accepted at the Cairo Conference of 1921, was approved, in spite of some opposition, by the Iraqi Council of State and confirmed in a referendum, and he was enthroned on 23 August 1921. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, through which the mandatory Power had decided to embody its obligations towards the League of Nations, was signed by the Iraq Government on 10 October 1922 against the determined opposition of nationalist elements, who insisted that the Treaty should terminate the Mandate and British influence, whereas it in fact incorporated the provisions of the Mandate, gave guarantees on judicial matters to make up for the abolition of the Capitulations, and guaranteed Great Britain's special interests in Iraq. Its period of validity, twenty years, was reduced the following year to four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey, which followed in July 1923; this, and the subsequent evolution of the British Government's attitude towards Iraq, were due largely to the increasing demand in Great Britain to terminate British commitments there. In March 1924, in spite of nationalist and Shii threats to boycott the elections, a Constituent Assembly was elected and was induced, in the face of considerable political and popular resentment, to accept the Treaty (June 1924), and later ratified it and the Organic Law, which had been drawn up on the basis of an Iraqi draft, after considerable disagreement between the King and the British Government on one side and Iraqi political opinion on the other over the royal powers.

In November the Council of the League of Nations awarded the major part of the Mosul vilayet to Iraq. In the same year a treaty between Turkey, Great Britain, and Iraq accepted the new frontiers as definitive and inviolable, while Iraq agreed to pay to Turkey 10 per cent on Mosul oil royalties on condition that the mandatory regime, as expressed in the Treaty, should continue for twenty-five years unless Iraq were previously admitted as a member of the League; this provision was embodied in a new Treaty in 1926. In September 1929 the British Government undertook to support Iraq's candidature for membership in 1932 and in 1930 a further new Treaty was signed, which provided for a close Anglo-Iraqi alliance, to last for twenty-five years from the admission of Iraq to the League. There was to be full and frank consultation between the parties in matters of foreign policy which might affect their common interest; mutual assistance in the event of war, including Iraq's provision of communications and all other facilities and assistance and the right of passage to British troops; and lease of sites for air bases near Basra and west of the Euphrates at which

Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1964 M1 Middle East
Iraq M111

648 forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction
[186] and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the
643 ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was
645 inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets
668 which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the
669 factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in
[185] assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

648 In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

Afghanistan, which provided for consultation in all disputes 648
that might affect the common interests of the four states.

Relations with Great Britain

During the period of independence the hostility of Iraqi 648
nationalists towards Great Britain in no way diminished. The 186
mandate had been replaced by a treaty that they had from the first opposed as denying full independence and their sentiments were strengthened by Syrian and Palestinian nationalists, deeply critical of British policy in Palestine, who took refuge in Iraq. A further stimulus was provided by Axis propaganda, which produced among nationalist groups not only hostility to Great Britain but a positive admiration for the totalitarian states. When King Ghazi killed himself in a motor accident in [643]
April 1939, to be succeeded by his infant son Faisal II, with the Amir Abdul-Ilah, Ghazi's cousin and brother-in-law, as Regent, there was a violent outburst of anti-British feeling in the belief that the accident was British-inspired.

Consequently, although the Iraqi Government severed diplomatic relations with Germany in September 1939, political opinion was divided on the measure of assistance to be granted to Great Britain under the Treaty; nationalists, especially in the all-important army, demanded non-belligerency and even the resumption of relations with Germany; and diplomatic relations with Italy were maintained. In 1941 the routine of political intrigue combined with nationalist and anti-British feeling and the effect of allied reverses, five years of Axis propaganda, and the presence of the Mufti of Jerusalem in Baghdad, to produce a chain of events which culminated in April 1941 in the last of the coups d'état. Rashid Ali al-Gailani seized 669
power with the support of an army group more violently 645
nationalist and anti-British than himself and formed a Government which was pledged to maintain Iraq's non-belligerency and displayed considerable sympathy towards the Axis. The Regent and several senior statesmen quitted the country. Relations were strained between the new Cabinet and the British Government, which was reluctant to recognize it, and on 2 May a disagreement over the passage of British troops through Iraq, on the basis of the Treaty, led to Anglo-Iraqi hostilities. These were terminated, after the introduction of further British forces and the Transjordan Arab Legion, on 29 May; by this time the Regent had returned to Iraq, the Rashid Ali Government had fled, and armistice negotiations were in progress. Shortly after the outbreak of Anglo-Iraqi hostilities the Iraqi Government had been in touch with

Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

German representatives for the provision of military aid. A number of aircraft were in fact dispatched with an advance party to Baghdad and Mosul and armaments were supplied by the Vichy Government of Syria, who also put its aerodromes at the disposal of German aircraft; but the coup was premature from the point of view of the German Command, whose forces were required for the immediate conquest of Crete and the all-essential invasion of the Soviet Union, and the assistance given was too late and limited to prevent collapse.

Succeeding Governments co-operated effectively with the Allied war effort, and Iraq became a base for operations against the Levant and Persia (1941) and for aid to Russia, and in January 1943 she declared war on the Axis Powers and signed the Declaration of the United Nations. In 1945 a rebellion of the Kurdish Barzani tribe, which had continued intermittently since 1943, was finally suppressed, and the rebels took refuge in the so-called Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (north-west Persia) which had newly been formed under Soviet inspiration, and, after its collapse, in the Soviet Union itself.

Relations with Other Middle East Countries

In 1945 Iraq signed the Arab League Pact, towards whose realization Nuri as-Said, Prime Minister from 1941 to 1944, played a leading part, though the Arab states rejected as premature his further proposal for the union of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan in one state. A project in 1946 for a close union between Iraq and Jordan was criticized both in the Arab League and in Iraq and Jordan, and was diluted into a treaty of alliance and eternal brotherhood between the two countries, which provided for consultation in the event of aggression by a third party and military intervention by one party to suppress disorders or rebellion in the other. In 1947, in spite of internal opposition, a treaty of friendship with Turkey was ratified. It was intended that Turkey should sign similar treaties with other Arab states to form a Middle East bloc in replacement of the moribund Saadabad Pact, but in the event Jordan was the only other state to sign.

In 1946 permission was given for the formation of political parties, of which none had existed since the mid-thirties. Licences were granted to five, of which two were subsequently suppressed, but were refused to the Communist groups, which continued to operate, as they had done both before and after their reinforcement in 1941, in secret. Though considerably weakened by official action against them in 1947, they are alleged to have played an active part in the disturbances at

Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date) 1954 M2 Middle East
Iraq MHI

the time of the Portsmouth Treaty, in which the remaining authorized parties also played an important part in opposition to the Government. After the withdrawal in 1947 of British forces, except those of the Royal Air Force stationed in the two Treaty bases, negotiations had been instituted for the revision of the Treaty itself and in January 1948 Salih Jabr, the Prime Minister, visited Great Britain and signed a new treaty at Portsmouth, by which the air bases were to be handed over to Iraq on the conclusion of peace treaties with the enemy Powers and thenceforth to be placed at the free disposal of British aircraft in transit, and an Anglo-Iraqi Joint Defence Board was to be established to co-ordinate defence matters. The Treaty was signed against a background of hostility towards the post-war Governments (and consequently against the Western Powers, who were supposed to provide their backing), aggravated by a grain crisis and the United Nations resolution to partition Palestine. Its announcement was greeted with student demonstrations; these were inadequately dealt with by the administration and, with the instigation of overt and probably clandestine political groups, developed into riots in which there were several casualties. Confronted with political opposition and mob violence, the Regent disowned the Treaty, after at first accepting it, and the Prime Minister with reluctance resigned. The Treaty was rejected by a new Government which, with its successors, restored outward calm. The Treaty of 1930 has since remained in force, although all political elements are pledged to revise or abrogate it.

The Palestine conflict evoked the strongest feelings in Iraq. Iraqi contingents fought there and were not withdrawn until 1949; and the closure of the Haifa oil pipeline has been maintained, at considerable financial loss. Similarly, at the time of the Lake Huleh incident in 1951, Iraqi anti-aircraft units were sent to Syria with considerable popular applause. In Iraq itself Zionist activity has been declared, like Communism, a criminal offence. There has been no overt retaliation against Iraqi Jews, but, in view of strong public feeling and governmental encouragement, some 130,000 from an approximate total of 150,000 quitted Iraq in 1951 and 1952, most of them for Israel, leaving an economic and financial vacuum which is only now being filled. The exodus was hastened by the discovery in 1951 of caches of arms and explosives on Jewish premises in Baghdad, together with documents which were stated to prove the existence of a Zionist organization for espionage and terrorism and its responsibility for several bomb outrages; a number of sentences were passed, two of death.

Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date) 1954 M1 Middle East
9 Iraq Mill

Since the Palestine conflict the main features of Iraq's external relations have been: (1) the possibility of union between Iraq and Syria and, immediately after the assassination of King Abdullah, between Iraq and Jordan. The former possibility, apparently within measurable distance under the Hinawi regime in Syria, was blocked by the coup d'état of Adib Shishakli, and the latter by the stand of Tawfiq Abul-Huda and the disapproval of the Western and other Arab Powers. (2) An unpopular draft agreement with Egypt in 1950 binding both parties not to intervene in Syrian affairs for five years, and binding Iraq to consult Egypt in the case of an agreement with any third Power (this was considered derogatory to the honour and independence of Iraq and brought about the fall of the Cabinet); (3) Nuri Said's statesmanlike attempt in 1951 to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in co-operation with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; (4) consideration of the four-Power Middle East Defence scheme, towards which the attitude of successive Governments has varied, falling short equally of acceptance and rejection, while opposition elements have displayed varying degrees of hostility to it and considerable sympathy towards the formation of a neutral Arab bloc; and (5) the ratification in March 1950 of the Arab States' Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Pact. In some quarters the idea of a bloc has been extended to include Pakistan and sometimes India, being conceived as an Islamic or mid-Asiatic entity which should supplement and even supplant the Arab League.

Present Political Situation

Events in Palestine, Syria, Persia, and Egypt and the economic difficulties of a great part of the population have intensified the underlying ferment of the post-war period, which overt and continued action against Communism and incipient plans for national development have not so far availed to counteract. The rural majority, it is true, is still politically inert and merely lends its voting power to the landowners and tribal chiefs, but the spread of education is increasing the number of politically-conscious and under-privileged young townsmen who have provided, without much confidence in their efficiency or integrity, almost the sole support for the parties of extreme opposition. These parties have been constant in their denunciation of successive Governments as the tools of feudalism and imperialism, the more bitterly and irresponsibly for the realization that there is no foreseeable likelihood of their coming to power or even of influencing policy except at moments of crisis

Iskoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1984 M) Middle East
Iraq MIII

cent of Iraq's oil revenues. The cost of the initial programme of the Board, as approved by Parliament, covers the years 1951–6 and is estimated at ID155,574,000. It provides for studies and research and training of Iraqi engineers and technicians; an ambitious plan for irrigation and drainage, including a number of major projects; the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals and health institutes, schools, housing for labourers and officials and public buildings; land reclamation, afforestation, agricultural research, animal husbandry; development of water-supplies, health resorts, aerodromes; industrial and mining projects. The programme of the Development Board has taken account of the report[1] of the mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which, at the request of the Government of Iraq, visited Iraq in 1951 to review the country's economic potentialities and assist the Government to formulate a long-term programme for the further development of productive resources.

By the end of 1953 measures had been taken towards the implementation of practically every item of this programme. Of the major projects, work on the Tharthar scheme for Tigris flood control was well in hand and its completion scheduled for March 1956. The Habbaniya scheme was sufficiently advanced to permit flood control of the Euphrates; work had already begun on the barrage, which would be completed at the end of 1955. Preliminary work was in progress for the construction of dams on the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, and Greater Zab, and schemes were under investigation for drainage and water utilization in the south and the generation of hydro-electric power. The construction of a bitumen refinery at Qaiyara, south of Mosul, was imminent and designs were complete for cement plants at Mosul and Kirkuk and a cotton textile factory of 0.2 annual capacity of 25 million square yards in Mosul.

Agriculture

Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country. It is estimated that about 80 per cent of the population derives its living directly or indirectly from the soil and, apart from oil, exported products are almost entirely agricultural. Nevertheless only some 20 per cent of the total area of the country is cultivable, and only some 36 per cent of this is actually under cultivation. The cultivable area has two main divisions: first the region to the north and east of a line running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin, where the rainfall is sufficient to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation; and second, the

[1] IBRD, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1952).

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Iraq MIN

563 acknowledge no law except their own customs, and no leadership
619 except that of their chief families, some of which, like the Baban
178 family, were virtually independent princes in Ottoman days.

Tribal feeling is still, as it has always been, stronger than Kurdish national feeling; and the Kurds have never formed a nation, still less a nation-state. In the last generation or so, however, new factors of unity have been arising. One is the growth of a Kurdish town-population. In the past the Kurds tended to leave commercial crafts to Jews and Christians, but now a Kurdish burgeoisie has appeared, in whom tribal loyalties are weaker and national ideals stronger. Another factor is the emergence of a Kurdish intelligentsia. Its education has been mainly non-Kurdish: Turkish in the days of the Ottoman Empire, Arabic and Western in the present generation; in consequence many of the educated Kurds have been assimilated to the Turks or Arabs. The majority, however, have remained Kurds, and have begun to develop a modern Kurdish press and literature, with its centres in Baghdad and Sulaimania. They are in contact with the centres of Kurdish life in Syria, Persia, Turkey and the Armenian Soviet Republic, and are forming and spreading the ideas of Kurdish independence and unity.

The Kurds under the Mandate

648 Before the war of 1914-18, the majority of the Kurds were
563 subject to Ottoman rule. It was natural, therefore, that the Allies should favour the idea of Kurdish autonomy: an ideal embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which provided for local autonomy for the Kurds still to be left in Turkey, or, if they themselves desired it, an independent state to include the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, of which the disposal was still undecided. The Treaty was never carried out, and was replaced in 1923 by that of Lausanne, which said nothing about a Kurdish State or about autonomy for Turkish Kurdistan. In the meantime, an Iraqi Government under British Mandate had been established, and, as it had been found impossible for economic and other reasons to establish a separate government for the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, it had been decided to incorporate them in the unitary State of Iraq. On the whole, the Kurds of the Mosul, Irbil and Kirkuk regions accepted this, but those of Sulaimania did not. In 1922 they revolted under the leadership of Shaikh Mahmud. The revolt was only with difficulty suppressed; and it was not

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Iraq MH1

until 1924 that the Iraqi Government was able to establish its authority in Sulaimania.

In the next year the Frontier Commission, which had been appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to decide upon the disposal of the Mosul Vilayet and the frontier between Iraq and Turkey, visited the Kurdish areas in the Vilayet. In its report it is recommended that, while the Vilayet should be allotted to Iraq, so far as possible the officials of administration, justice and education in the Kurdish areas should be Kurds, and Kurdish should be recognised as an official language. This recommendation was adopted by the League Council, which stated, in its decision on the Mosul issue, that

> the British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations . . . the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the Commission. . . .[1]

There can be no doubt that both the mandatory authorities and the Iraqi Government did on the whole carry out the recommendation of the League Commission. But administrative concessions did not satisfy the Kurds, or at least those of the Sulaimania region. It was not only that they had been promised autonomy by the Treaty of Sèvres and deprived of their hope by the Treaty of Lausanne; even more important was it that they interpreted the recommendation of the Commission as promising them not simply administrative conveniences but also some sort of regional autonomy, and this misunderstanding was never removed. Their discontent found its expression in another revolt, again led by Shaikh Mahmud, in 1927. It was increased by the unfriendly policy towards their fellow-nationals pursued by the Governments of Turkey and Iran, and more especially by the signature of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which contained no safeguards for minorities. Quite apart from the dislike of most Kurds for most Arabs, the former could not view with any pleasure the prospect of their being subjected to a Government which was likely to be similar in spirit to those of Turkey and Iran.

Efforts were made to dispel these fears. On the one hand,

[1] Decision Relating to Turco-Iraq Frontier. Adopted by the Council of the League of Nations, Geneva, December 16, 1925. H.M. Stationery Office, Misc. 17. Cmd. 2562, 1925.

Iraq MH1

the Acting High Commissioner and the Acting Prime Minister visited Kurdistan together, and made statements in which, while condemning separatism and emphasizing the unity of Iraq, they spoke of the Government's resolve to satisfy the linguistic and other demands of the Kurds. On the other hand, a number of conciliatory measures, both legislative and administrative, were taken. The most important of them was the Local Languages Law already mentioned.

In spite of this, revolt once more broke out among the Kurds, first under Shaikh Mahmud (1930–1) and then under Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan (1932). The causes of these revolts were partly political and partly personal. They were only subdued through the intervention of the R.A.F.

The Kurds since the Treaty

From 1932 to 1943 the Kurds did not revolt again, but continued to be restless and unwilling to accept the authority of the Government. There were two main reasons for their restlessness. The first was the growth of Kurdish national spirit, due partly to the gradual appearance of a class of educated Kurds, partly to a natural reaction against Pan-Arabism. The encouragement given by the French to Kurdish nationalism in the Syrian Jazirah, and by the Russians to Kurdish autonomy in the Caucasus, may also have had a certain although a limited influence. The second and more fundamental reason was to be found in the particular administrative grievances of the Kurdish tribes. The Iraqi Government made little attempt to carry out the provisions of the various laws passed during the mandatory period. Government departments in Baghdad tended to neglect the claims of districts so far away from the capital; and the Kurds had no way of making their voice heard effectively and compelling the Government to pay attention to their needs. In general, Arab officials in the northern provinces failed to understand the mentality and needs of the Kurdish people (although Kurdish officials in Arab districts were often highly successful). The gap between administration and inhabitants was perhaps greatest in the Mosul liwa, where the administration was largely under the influence of the Arab townspeople of Mosul itself.

The Government's neglect showed itself in every sphere. There were few facilities for education, and those which existed were mainly for education in Arabic. Again, nothing was done

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

COTTON IN IRAQ

The program is undoubtedly ambitious. It requires a rate of progress unprecedented for a country which for many centuries remained virtually static and which over recent decades has developed at a relatively slow pace. There is no assurance that the program can be carried out over the next five years. Yet the Mission thought it important to set up targets, even ambitious targets, toward which the country can strive. If successful, the program will bring about a profound economic and social transformation, with far-reaching repercussions. 652 654

The International Bank concludes that the country will need no further foreign loans except possibly to meet part of the hard currency needs.[24] The oil revenues will be received in the form of sterling. However, under a new agreement, the United Kingdom has undertaken to furnish sufficient dollars against sterling to cover Iraq's essential needs.

The International Bank in 1950 already had loaned $12.6 million to Iraq, primarily for flood control, irrigation, and road construction. Apparently the Bank is willing to consider further loans, but the Iraqi are not interested as long as the oil revenues continue and they are able to get sterling converted into dollars.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

A number of organizations are providing technical assistance to Iraq in its development program, notably the United States Point Four Program and the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization. 648 654

Point Four began its program early in 1952 in such fields as cotton agronomy, farm machinery, agricultural extension and vocational education, irrigation, entomology, rural health, sanitation, and industrial development. About 50 Americans have been employed, and the number may be doubled by the end of the year. Most of the Point Four funds go for salaries; the costs of tools and materials are assumed by the local government. The specialists in Iraq obviously were chosen for their competence, practical experience, and their interest in the assignment. They are anxious to develop the most desirable means of approaching the problem.

The Food and Agriculture Organization has about 11 specialists regularly employed in the country in such fields as soils, cooperatives, bacteriology, veterinary science, nutrition, agricultural statistics, farm mechanization, and home economics. The program may be extended to cover agricultural research, extension, underground water and drainage, forestry, and fisheries.

The FAO operates almost entirely at the government level; Point Four seeks to go beyond government planning to the grass roots.

INDUSTRY

The people of Iraq, in common with their neighbors of the Middle East, live almost entirely by agriculture. About 80 per cent of the population earns its living directly from the soil, and most of the others indirectly.[25] Industry is still relatively undeveloped. Apart from the oil industry, which employs about 12,000 people, probably not more than 2,000 people are employed in what are called modern industrial plants. 162 423

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[24] Ibid., p. 63.
[25] Ibid., p. 65.

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 MI Middle East
IRAQ MHI

191

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY IN RESPECT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ[1]

JUNE 30, 1930

643

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

And His Majesty the King of Iraq,

Whereas they desire to consolidate the friendship and to maintain and perpetuate the relations of good understanding between their respective countries; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty undertook in the Treaty of Alliance signed at Baghdad on the 13th of January, 1926, that he would take into active consideration at successive intervals of four years the question whether it was possible for him to press for the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations; and

Whereas His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland informed the Iraq Government without qualification or proviso on the 14th of September, 1929, that they were prepared to support the candidature of Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in the year 1932 and announced to the Council of the League on the 4th of November, 1929, that this was their intention; and

Whereas the mandatory responsibilities accepted by His Britannic Majesty in respect of Iraq will automatically terminate upon the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations; and

[1] English text in "Treaty Series No. 15" (1931), Cmd. 3797, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1931. Cf. also the Convention between the United States, Great Britain, and Iraq, signed at London, January 9, 1930, *Rights of the United States of America and of Its Nationals in Iraq*, "Treaty Series No. 833," Washington, Government Printing Office, 1931. A new Treaty of Alliance designed to replace this Treaty was signed at Portsmouth on January 15, 1948, by Mr. Ernest Bevin, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Saiyid Salih Jabr, Prime Minister of Iraq. But the new Treaty met with opposition in Iraq, and the Prime Minister of Iraq resigned office. The Treaty has not been ratified; see text with comments and exchange of letters in *Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Majesty the King of Iraq*, "Iraq No. 1" (1948), Cmd. 7309, London H. M. Stationery Office.—ED.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

648 Whereas His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq consider that the relations which will subsist between them as independent sovereigns should be defined by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance and Amity:

Have agreed to conclude a new Treaty for this purpose on terms of complete freedom, equality and independence which will become operative upon the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations. . . .[1]

Art. 1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq.

There shall be established between the High Contracting Parties a close alliance in consecration of their friendship, their cordial understanding and their good relations, and there shall be full and frank consultation between them in all matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or might create difficulties for the other party thereto.

Art. 2. Each High Contracting Party will be represented at the Court of the other High Contracting Party by a diplomatic representative duly accredited.

Art. 3. Should any dispute between Iraq and a third State produce a situation which involves the risk of a rupture with that State, the High Contracting Parties will concert together with a view to the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of any other international obligations which may be applicable to the case.

Art. 4. Should, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 above, either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will, subject always to the provisions of Article 9 below, immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally. In the event of an imminent menace of war the High Contracting Parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defence. The aid of His Majesty the King of Iraq in the event of war or the imminent menace of war will consist in furnishing to His Britannic Majesty on Iraq territory all facilities and

[1] Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations October 3, 1932. See p. 197 below. —Ed.

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle Eas
IRAQ MH

assistance in his power including the use of railways, rivers, ports, 648
aerodromes and means of communication.

Art. 5. It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in Iraq and, subject to the provisions of Article 4 above, for the defence of Iraq from external aggression rests with His Majesty the King of Iraq. Nevertheless, His Majesty the King of Iraq recognises that the permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty is in the common interest of the High Contracting Parties. For this purpose and in order to facilitate the discharge of the obligations of His Britannic Majesty under Article 4 above His Majesty the King of Iraq undertakes to grant to His Britannic Majesty for the duration of the Alliance sites for air bases to be selected by His Britannic Majesty at or in the vicinity of Basra and for an air base to be selected by His Britannic Majesty to the west of the Euphrates. His Majesty the King of Iraq further authorises his Britannic Majesty to maintain forces upon Iraq territory at the above localities in accordance with the provisions of the Annexure of this Treaty on the understanding that the presence of those forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Iraq.

Art. 6. The Annexure hereto shall be regarded as an integral part of the present Treaty.

Art. 7. This Treaty shall replace the Treaties of Alliance signed at Baghdad on the 10th day of October, 1922, and on the 13th day of January, 1926, and the subsidiary agreements thereto, which shall cease to have effect upon the entry into force of this Treaty. It shall be executed in duplicate, in the English and Arabic languages, of which the former shall be regarded as the authoritative version.

Art. 8. The High Contracting Parties recognize that, upon the entry into force of this Treaty, all responsibilities devolving under the Treaties and Agreements referred to in Article 7 hereof upon His Britannic Majesty in respect of Iraq will, in so far as His Britannic Majesty is concerned, then automatically and completely come to an end, and that such responsibilities, in so far as they continue at all, will devolve upon His Majesty the King of Iraq alone.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

648 It is also recognised that all responsibilities devolving upon His Britannic Majesty in respect of Iraq under any other international instrument, in so far as they continue at all, should similarly devolve upon His Majesty the King of Iraq alone, and the High Contracting Parties shall immediately take such steps as may be necessary to secure the transference to His Majesty the King of Iraq of these responsibilties.

Art. 9. Nothing in the present Treaty is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris on the 27th day of August, 1928.

Art. 10. Should any difference arise relative to the application or the interpretation of this Treaty and should the High Contracting Parties fail to settle such difference by direct negotiation, then it shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Art. 11. This Treaty shall be ratified and ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force as soon as Iraq has been admitted to membership of the League of Nations.

The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty-five years from the date of its coming into force. At any time after twenty years from the date of the coming into force of this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, conclude a new Treaty which shall provide for the continued maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty. In case of disagreement in this matter the difference will be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.

Annexure to the Treaty of Alliance

1. The strength of the forces maintained in Iraq by His Britannic Majesty in accordance with the terms of Article 5 of this Treaty shall be determined by His Britannic Majesty from time to time after consultation with His Majesty the King of Iraq.

His Britannic Majesty shall maintain forces at Hinaidi for a period of five years after the entry into force of this Treaty in order to enable His Majesty the King of Iraq to organise the necessary

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

forces to replace them. By the expiration of that period the said 648
forces of His Britannic Majesty shall have been withdrawn from
Hinaidi. It shall be also open to His Britannic Majesty to maintain forces at Mosul for a maximum period of five years from the entry into force of this Treaty. Thereafter it shall be open to His Britannic Majesty to station his forces in the localities mentioned in Article 5 of this Treaty, and His Majesty the King of Iraq will grant to His Britannic Majesty for the duration of the Alliance leases of the necessary sites for the accommodation of the forces of His Britannic Majesty in those localities.

2. Subject to any modifications which the two High Contracting Parties may agree to introduce in the future, the immunities and privileges in jurisdictional and fiscal matters, including freedom from taxation, enjoyed by the British forces in Iraq will continue to extend to the forces referred to in Clause 1 above and to such of His Britannic Majesty's forces of all arms as may be in Iraq in pursuance of the present Treaty and its annexure or otherwise by agreement between the High Contracting Parties, and the existing provisions of any local legislation affecting the armed forces of His Britannic Majesty in Iraq shall also continue. The Iraq Government will take the necessary steps to ensure that the altered conditions will not render the position of the British forces as regards immunities and privileges in any way less favourable than that enjoyed by them at the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.

3. His Majesty the King of Iraq agrees to provide all possible facilities for the movement, training and maintenance of the forces referred to in Clause 1 above and to accord to those forces the same facilities for the use of wireless telegraphy as those enjoyed by them at the date of the entry into force of the present Treaty.

4. His Majesty the King of Iraq undertakes to provide at the request and at the expense of His Britannic Majesty and upon such conditions as may be agreed between the High Contracting Parties special guards from his own forces for the protection of such air bases as may, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, be occupied by the forces of His Britannic Majesty, and to secure the enactment of such legislation as may be necessary for the fulfilment of the conditions referred to above.

5. His Britannic Majesty undertakes to grant whenever they may

DECLARATION ON TERMINATION OF MANDATORY REGIME

represented on the Council shall be held to be a dispute of an inter-
national character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations. Any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands,
be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The
decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the
same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

CHAPTER II

Art. 11. *Most-favoured-nation Clause.* (1) Subject to reciprocity, Iraq undertakes to grant to Members of the League most-favoured-nation treatment for a period of ten years from the date of its admission to membership of the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, should measures taken by any Member of the League of Nations, whether such measures are in force at the above-mentioned date or are taken during the period contemplated in the preceding paragraph, be of such a nature as to diminish to the detriment of Iraq the balance of trade between Iraq and the Member of the League of Nations in question, by seriously affecting the total exports of Iraq, the latter, in view of its special situation, reserves to itself the right to request the Member of the League of Nations concerned to open negotiations immediately for the purpose of restoring the balance.

Should an agreement not be reached by negotiation within three months from its request, Iraq declares that it will consider itself as freed, *vis-à-vis* of the Member of the League in question, from the obligation laid down in the first sub-paragraph above.

(2) The undertaking contained in paragraph 1 above shall not apply to any advantages which are, or may in the future be accorded by Iraq to any adjacent country in order to facilitate frontier traffic, or to those resulting from a Customs union concluded by Iraq. Nor shall the undertaking apply to any special advantages in Customs matters which Iraq may grant to goods the produce or manufacture of Turkey or of any country whose territory prior to 1914 wholly included in the Ottoman Empire in Asia.

Art. 12. *Judicial Organization.* A uniform system of justice shall be applicable to all, Iraqis and foreigners alike. It shall be such as effectively to ensure the protection and full exercise of their rights both to foreigners and to nationals.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

642
648 The judicial system at present in force, and based on Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Agreement between the Mandatory Power and Iraq, signed on March 4th, 1931, shall be maintained for a period of 10 years from the date of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations.

Appointments to the posts reserved for foreign jurists by Article 2 of the said Agreement shall be made by the Iraqi Government. Their holders shall be foreigners, but selected without distinction of nationality; they must be fully qualified.

Art. 13. *International Conventions.* Iraq considers itself bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which it has become a party, whether by its own action or by that of the Mandatory Power acting on its behalf. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by Iraq throughout the period for which they were concluded.

Art. 14. *Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations.* Iraq, taking note of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of September 15th, 1925:

(1) Declares that all rights of whatever nature acquired before the termination of the mandatory regime by individuals, associations or juridical persons shall be respected.

(2) Undertakes to respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on Iraq's behalf by the Mandatory Power during the period of the Mandate.

Art. 15. *Freedom of Conscience.* Subject to such measures as may be essential for the maintenance of public order and morality, Iraq undertakes to ensure and guarantee throughout its territory freedom of conscience and worship and the free exercise of the religious, educational and medical activities of religious missions of all denominations, whatever the nationality of those missions or of their members.

Art. 16. *Final Clause.* The provisions of the present chapter constitute obligations of international concern. Any Member of the League of Nations may call the attention of the Council to any infraction of these provisions. They may not be modified except by

57: Davis S-4 (no date)1953 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MHI

agreement between Iraq and the Council of the League of Nations acting by a majority vote. 642 648

Any difference of opinion which may arise between Iraq and any Member of the League of Nations represented on the Council, with regard to the interpretation or the execution of the said provisions, shall, by an application by such Member, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The undersigned, duly authorised, accepts on behalf of Iraq, subject to ratification, the above provisions, being the declaration provided for by the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of May 19th, 1932.

57:Davis S-4 (no date) 1953 Ml Middle East
IRAQ MH1

204

NOTE ON TREATIES

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1. Treaty of Friendship between Afghanistan and Iraq.[1]

2. Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Iraq,[2] signed at Baghdad on April 14, 1947. The Treaty came into force on June 6, 1947, after the exchange of ratifications had been completed on that day.

3. Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations between Iraq and Turkey[3] (with six annexed Protocols), signed at Ankara on March 29, 1946. The Treaty came into force on May 10, 1948, by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Baghdad.

4. Iraq is a party to the Saadabad Pact,[4] the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood with Saudi Arabia to which Yemen adhered,[5] the Pact of the Arab League[6] and the Cultural Treaty of the Arab League.[7]

5. Iraq is an original member of the United Nations and deposited its ratification of the Charter on October 30, 1945.

[1] See above, p. 24.
[2] Text in United Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. 23 (1948-1949), No. 345, pp. 147-154. In the preamble it is stated that the Treaty is concluded "in execution of Article 9 of the Charter of the Arab League" (see below, p. 530).
[3] Text in United Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. 37 (1949), pp. 281-331.
[4] See below, p. 523.
[5] See below, p. 518.
[6] See below, p. 527.
[7] See below, p. 534.

63:Simmons et al G-8 (1961-1981) 1964
M1 Middle East
IRAQ MH1

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Iraq

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

Iraq is a constitutional monarchy which has been an independent sovereign state since the termination, in 1932, of the mandate awarded Great Britain by the League of Nations. Historically, it is identified with Mesopotamia, the "land between the rivers" and the home of one of the oldest civilizations known to man. Modern Iraq has an area of about 170,000 square miles, encompassing the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, a fringe of highlands in the north and an expanse of desert in the southwest. It extends from the Persian Gulf and Arabia in the south to Turkey in the north, and from Iran in the east to Syria and Jordan in the west. The country is conveniently divided into four geographic regions—the alluvial plains of the rivers, the mountain ranges backing the northern and the northeastern frontiers, the intervening uplands and the desert.

Rising in the mountains of eastern Anatolia, the Tigris River flows for 770 miles through Iraq, and in its northern course receives several tributaries, the most important in Iraqi territory being the Great Zab, the Little Zab and the Diyala. The Euphrates River also takes its source in Anatolia but meanders across central Syria and, subsequently, for 750 miles in Iraq before converging with the Tigris at Al Qurnah. The Shatt al Arab, formed by the union of the two rivers, flows for about 100 miles to the Persian Gulf, and for part of its length marks the boundary with Iran. The lower Euphrates and Tigris valleys form a great deltaic plain which reaches back from the Gulf to a zone north of Baghdad. It is

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